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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN PERU?

PETRAS & RIMENSNYDER

MILITARISM AND IMPERIALISM

HARRY MAGDOFF

More Thoughts on the Movement

JOHN McDERMOTT

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CONTENTS | VOLUME XXI NUMBER 9 FEBRUARY 1970

REVIEW OF THE MONTH: Militarism and Imperialism by Harry Magdoff 1
WHAT IS HAPPENING IN PERU? by James Petras and Nelson Rimensnyder 15
PAUL NIZAN: PHILOSOPHER OF REVOLUTION by Andrew Feenberg 29
MORE THOUGHTS ON THE MOVEMENT by John McDermott 36
BOOKS: Oil and the Third World by Harvey O'Connor 50
CORRESPONDENCE: Politics in Command: A Commentary by C. E. Wilson 54
PROBLEMS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT by Nicolás Guillén 57
WORLD EVENTS by Scott Nearing 59

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EDITORS: Paul M. Sweezy Harry Magdoff Leo Huberman (1903-1968)
ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Bobbye Ortiz

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Those who have recently looked at the MR masthead will have seen that it contains a new name: Bobbye Ortiz as Associate Editor. Best known to MR readers for her translations from Spanish (e.g., Régis Debray's *Revolution in the Revolution?*), she now assumes wider duties and more responsibility in the operations of the magazine. Among other things, she will keep a close watch on books and periodicals published in the Latin languages (Spanish, French, and Italian), and in this connection she would be glad to hear from any readers who run across material (not necessarily only in the Latin languages) which they feel is of particular value.

As we go to press, Harry Magdoff is leaving for England where he will participate during the next three weeks in a series of seminars at Ox-

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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MILITARISM AND IMPERIALISM

BY HARRY MAGDOFF

Peace reigns supreme in the realm of neo-classical economics. War, militarism, and the pacification of natives are treated as merely elements which disturb the harmonious equilibrium models which are to supply us with the universal truths about the allocation of scarce resources.

One of the distinguishing features of Marxist thought, on the other hand, is the conviction that economic processes must be understood as part of a social organism in which political force plays a leading role and in which war is at least as typical as peace. In this context, militarism and imperialism are seen as major determinants of the form and direction of technological change, of the allocation of resources within a country, and of the allocation of resources between countries (notably, between rich and poor countries). Accordingly, price and income relations, treated as the ultimate yardsticks of economic efficiency and social justice in neo-classical economics, are viewed, in the Marxist context, as evolutionary products of capitalist institutions in which political force and "pure" eco-

This is a paper that was delivered at a session on "The Economics of Imperialism," at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association, on December 30, 1969.

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nomics are intertwined. Rosa Luxemburg put the Marxist case this way:

> Bourgeois liberal theory takes into account only [one aspect of economic development]: the realm of "peaceful competition," the marvels of technology and pure commodity exchange; it separates it strictly from the other aspect: the realm of capital's blustering violence which is regarded as more or less incidental to foreign policy and quite independent of the economic sphere of capital.
>
> In reality, political power is nothing but a vehicle for the economic process. The conditions for the reproduction of capital provide the organic link between these two aspects of the accumulation of capital. The historical career of capitalism can be appreciated only by taking them together.*[1]

The facts of U.S. history provide eloquent testimony to the accuracy of this diagnosis. Thus, Professor Quincy Wright, who directed a major study of war under the auspices of Chicago University, observed in 1942: "The United States, which has, perhaps somewhat unjustifiably, prided itself on its peacefulness, has had only twenty years during its entire history when its army or navy has not been in active operation some days, somewhere."[2]

Professor Wright identifies years of peace as those in which no action of any sort occurred. A more revealing picture is obtained if we measure months of war against months of peace and bring the information up to the present. Adding up the months during which U.S. military forces were engaged in action—starting from the Revolutionary War and including wars against the Indians, punitive expeditions to Latin America and Asia, as well as major wars—we find that the United States was engaged in warlike activity during three-fourths of its history, in 1782 of the last 2340 months.[3] In other words, on the average, there have been three full years in which our armed forces have been engaged in action for every full year of peace. This comparison does not indicate the full extent of the use of military power by the United States to enforce its will. For example, it does not include activities such as those formerly conducted by U.S. gunboats in a "constant patrol in

* Notes will be found at the end of the article.

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the Yangtze River . . . from the mouth of the river up nearly 2,000 miles into the very heart of China."[4]

It should therefore come as no surprise to discover that war-related expenditures have constituted the dominant sector of the federal budget throughout our history. Omitting the years of the Second World War and the postwar period, where the record is so well known, a tabulation of federal expenditures by decade, from 1800 to 1939, for army, navy, veterans' compensation and pensions, and interest on the debt—prior to the New Deal federal debt incurred was primarily a result of war spending—shows that except for one decade, at least 54 percent of federal expenditures were for military activities or preparations during the decade or to meet obligations arising from previous military activity.[5] The one exception was the decade of the great depression (1930-1939) when the percentage dropped to somewhat below 40 percent. In seven of the fourteen decades the war-related share of the federal budget was 70 percent or more.

This almost continuous preoccupation with military affairs was clearly not inspired by fears of invading barbarians. Of course, the competing colonial and commercial interests of France, England, Spain, and Russia were part of the reality in which the infant and adolescent United States had to operate. At times, self-defense had to be considered. Moreover, resolution of internal tensions, as in the Civil War, exercised a major influence on military aspects of U.S. life. All of this, however, occurred within a context of empire-building. For there has been a continuous thread in U.S. history, beginning with colonial and revolutionary days, of economic, political, and military expansionism directed towards the creation and growth of an American empire. The original expansionism, for which military investment was needed, concentrated on three main thrusts: (1) consolidation of a transcontinental nation, (2) obtaining control of the Caribbean area, and (3) achieving a major position in the Pacific Ocean.[6] It should be noted that this expansionism was not confined to what is now considered the continental territory of the United States: striving for control of the seas, as a shield and promoter of international commerce,

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has been an ingredient of U.S. policy from its earliest days. In fact, the struggle to incorporate the West Coast into the United States was, among other things, prompted by the desire to control Pacific Ocean ports for the Asian trade.[7]

The experience thus gained in the early stages of empire-building turned out to be most useful when the leading nations of the world entered the stage of imperialism. Several decisive and coinciding developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries mark off this new stage:

(1) The onset of significant concentration of economic power in the hands of a relatively small number of industrial and financial giants in advanced nations. Competing interest-groups continued to exist, but now the success or failure of the advanced economies became closely identified with the prosperity of the new giant corporations whose *modus operandi* required control over international sources of supply and markets.

(2) The decline of Great Britain's monopoly position as world trader and world banker. The burgeoning competitive industrial powers—notably, Germany, France, the United States, and Japan—pressed for a reshuffle of established trade relations and a redistribution of world markets.

(3) Industrialization and new naval technology enabled competitive nations to build up their own naval strength to the point where Great Britain could no longer maintain unilateral control over the major sea lanes. As Quincy Wright put it in the study already referred to, "Naval inventions and the spread of industrialization had ended the *pax Britannica*."[8] Control over sea routes also involved establishing military bases where naval units could be refueled and repaired. The availability of decisive mobile military power on the one hand required acquisition of strategic foreign territory to support bases, and on the other hand provided the means for aggressive pursuit of colonial possessions.

(4) The earliest stage of the new imperialism engendered a race by the major powers for control of available foreign real estate. According to Theodore Ropp, after 1880 "every

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great power except Austria-Hungary . . . became involved in . . . active, conscious colonial expansionism . . . .[9] Of the traditional colonial powers—the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Britain, France, and Russia—the last four continued to add to their holdings. (Spain, after losing Cuba and the Philippines, proceeded to conquer Spanish Morocco.) And at the same time five new powers entered the race for colonial territory: Germany, Italy, Belgium, Japan, and the United States. As for the United States, it was the Spanish-American War, of course, that placed it with both feet in the imperialist camp. And it was success in this war, plus the subsequent pacification of the Cuban and Philippine "natives," which satisfied two long-term U.S. expansionist ambitions: a leading position in the Caribbean, broadening the highway to the rest of Latin America, and a solid base in the Pacific for a greater stake in Asian business.

As far as the United States is concerned, there have been three distinct stages in the drive to empire: (1) the period when the United States was the supplier of food and raw materials to the rest of the world, when it was an importer of capital, and when maritime commercial interests were relatively very strong; (2) the period when the United States began to compete with other industrialized nations as an exporter of manufactured goods and an exporter of capital—a time when a small number of industrial and financial giants began to dominate the economic scene; and (3) the period when the United States becomes the major, dominant capitalist economy, the largest manufacturer, foreign investor, trader, the world's banker, and the dollar becomes the key international currency.

The energy and determination with which the expansionist strategy is pursued change from time to time. In the transition from one period to another, and because of internal as well as external conditions, it appears at times as if the United States is "isolationist" and uninterested in further extension of its influence and control.[10] Yet it is especially noteworthy that the drive for business opportunities on a world scale is ever present. Even when, as in New Deal days, domestic solutions

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were sought for crises, the development of foreign business was high on the agenda of government and private enterprise. Given the structure of the economy, the major operating levers work in such a way as to repeatedly reassert expansionism as the dominant strategy. In this perspective, the history of the years since the end of the Second World War are far from a new departure; instead, they are a culmination of long-term tendencies which profited by and matured most readily in the environment created by the course of the last major war.

The postwar leap forward in empire-building and the transition of U.S. society to rampant militarism are associated with two phenomena: (1) the desire to resist and repress socialist nations and to defeat national liberation movements designed to release underdeveloped countries from dependence on the imperialist network, and (2) the extension of U.S. power to fill "vacuums" created by the decline of Western European and Japanese influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Combating the rise of socialism is of course not a new objective. The destruction of the Russian Revolution was a top priority of the imperialist powers beginning in 1917. In this connection, Thorstein Veblen's observations on the Versailles Treaty in his 1920 review of Keynes's *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* are most pertinent:

> The events of the past months go to show that the central and most binding provision of the Treaty (and of the League) is an unrecorded clause by which the governments of the Great Powers are banded together for the suppression of Soviet Russia—unrecorded unless record of it is to be found somewhere among the secret archives of the League or of the Great Powers. Apart from this unacknowledged compact there appears to be nothing in the Treaty that has any character of stability or binding force. Of course, this compact for the reduction of Soviet Russia was not written into the text of the Treaty; it may rather be said to have been the parchment upon which the text was written.[11]

The failure of the United States to join the League of Nations reflected no slackness in its efforts to contain anti-imperialist revolutions: in Russia, these efforts took the form of armed intervention and support of anti-Bolshevik forces with

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food and other economic supplies; in Hungary, the manipulation of food supplies to help defeat the Bela Kun government. Surely the issue at that time was not fear of aggressive Russian or Hungarian militarism. Nor can much credit be given to political or religious idealism. The relevant motive, clearly, was recovery of territory lost to free enterprise and prevention of the spread of the contagious revolutionary disease to Western Europe and the colonies. Any such spread, it was recognized, would severely affect the stability and prosperity of the remaining capitalist nations.

Capitalism as an economic system was never confined to one nation. It was born, developed, and prospered as part of a world system. Karl Marx went so far as to claim, "The specific task of bourgeois society is the establishment of a world market, at least in outline, and of production based upon this world market."[12] One might add that it has been the specific task of imperialism to fill out this outline and establish a complex international network of trade, finance, and investment. Given this network, it follows that limitation of opportunity to trade and invest in one part of the world restricts to a greater or lesser extent the freedom of action of private enterprise in other parts of the world. The dimensions of the defense of free enterprise therefore become world-wide.

The United States had long ago accepted its destiny to open and keep open the door for trade and investment in other parts of the world. The obstacles were not only the heathens who wanted to be left alone, but the preference systems established in the colonies of the older nations. The decline of political colonialism and the weakness of the other great powers thus placed upon the United States a primary responsibility for the defense of the capitalist system and at the same time afforded golden opportunities to obtain special beachheads and open doors for U.S. enterprise.

With a task of this magnitude, it is little wonder that the United States now has a larger "peacetime" war machine, covering a greater part of the globe, than has any other nation in all of past history. Imperialism necessarily involves militarism. Indeed, they are twins that have fed on each other in the

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past, as they do now. Yet not even at the peak of the struggle for colonies did any of the imperialist powers, or combination of powers, maintain a war machine of such size and such dispersion as does the United States today. In 1937, when the arms race in preparation for the Second World War was already under way, the per capita military expenditures of all the great powers combined—the United States, the British Empire, France, Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union—was $25. (Germany's per capita of $58.82 was then the largest.)[13] In 1968, the per capita military expenditures of the United States alone, in 1937 prices, was $132. This was only in part due to the Vietnam War: in 1964, our most recent "peace" year, the per capita military expenditures in 1937 prices was $103.[14]

One of the reasons for this huge increase in military outlays is no doubt the greater sophistication of weaponry. (By the same token, it is the advanced airplane and missile technology which makes feasible the U.S. globe-straddling military posture.) An additional reason, of course, is the military strength of the socialist camp. I would like to suggest a third reason: that a substantial portion of the huge military machine, including that of the Western European nations, is the price being paid to maintain the imperialist network of trade and investment *in the absence of colonialism*. The achievement of political independence by former colonies has stimulated internal class struggles in the new states for economic as well as political independence. Continuing the economic dependence of these nations on the metropolitan centers within the framework of political independence calls for, among other things, the world-wide dispersion of U.S. military forces and the direct military support of the local ruling classes.

Precise information on the dispersion of U.S. forces is kept an official secret. However, retired General David M. Shoup, former head of the Marine Corps, who should be in a position to make a realistic estimate, stated in a recent article in *The Atlantic*: "We maintain more than 1,517,000 Americans in uniform overseas in 119 countries. We have 8 treaties to help defend 48 nations if they ask us to or if we

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choose to intervene in their affairs."[15] The main substance of U.S. overseas power, aside from its present application in Vietnam, is spread out over 429 major and 2,972 minor military bases. These bases cover 4,000 square miles in 30 foreign countries, as well as Hawaii and Alaska.[16] Backing this up, and acting as a coordinator of the lesser imperialist powers and the Third World incorporated in the imperialist network, is a massive program of military assistance. According to a recent study:

> U.S. military aid . . . since 1945 has averaged more than $2 billion per year. It rose to as much as $5 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1952 and fell to as low as $831 million in FY 1956. The number of recipient countries rose from 14 in 1950 to a peak so far of 69 in 1963. In all, some 80 countries have received a total of $50 billion in American military aid since World War II. Except for 11 hard-core communist countries and certain nations tied closely to either Britain or France, very few nations have never received military aid of one kind or another from the United States.[17]

The above factual recital by no means exhausts the international functions of U.S. militarism. Space considerations permit no more than passing reference to (a) the active promotion of commercial armament sales abroad (contributing a sizable portion of the merchandise export surplus in recent years), (b) the extensive training of foreign military personnel, and (c) the use of economic-aid funds to train local police forces for "handling mob demonstrations and counterintelligence work."[18] These are, in the main, additional instruments for maintaining adherence and loyalty of the non-socialist world to the free-enterprise system in general, and to the United States in particular.

The military forces of the politically independent underdeveloped countries frequently perform a very special function. This arises from the relative weaknesses of the competitive elite power groups: large landowners, merchants, industrialists and financiers—each with varying degrees of alliance to interest groups in the metropolitan center. When none of these ruling-class groups has the strength and resources to take the political

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reins in its own hands and assert its hegemony over the others, the social order is operated by means of temporary and unstable alliances. Under such circumstances, and especially when the existing order is threatened by social revolution, the military organizations become increasingly important as a focal point for the power struggle within the ruling classes and/or as the organizer of political arrangements. Space limitations do not permit a review of this special role of militarism in the underdeveloped world as, one might say, the skeletal framework of the imperialist system in the absence of colonies. It is this framework that is supported and nurtured by the practices mentioned above: military training and advisory services, the widespread military assistance programs, and the stimulus given to commercial sales of U.S. armaments.

This militarism which is working to control the rest of the world is at the same time helping to shape the nature of U.S. society. Some sense of the immensity of this impact can be obtained by noting the relevance of military spending on the employment/unemployment situation. In the first three quarters of 1969, approximately 8.3 million persons were employed as a result of the military program: 3.5 million in the armed services, 1.3 million Defense Department civilian employees, and 3.5 million engaged in producing and moving the goods purchased for the military services.[19] At the same time, there are at least 3.7 million unemployed.[20]

Consider for a moment what it would mean if 8.3 million were not engaged in military affairs. Without substitute employment, this could mean a total of over 12 million unemployed, or a 14.3 percent rate of unemployment. The last time the United States had such a rate of unemployment was 1937. The percentage of the labor force unemployed in 1931, the second full year of the great depression, was less than 2 points higher, 15.9 percent.[21]

So far we have not taken into account the multiplier effect. It has been estimated that for every $1 spent on national defense, another $1 to $1.40 of national product is stimulated.[22] If we accept only the lower estimate, and assume for the sake of the argument equivalent labor productivity in the mili-

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tary and civilian sectors, we reach a measure of unemployment in the neighborhood of 24.3 percent, in the absence of the military budget. Compare this with the unemployment rate of 24.9 percent at the depth of the depression in 1932.

A counter-argument can, of course, be made to these broad generalizations. Unemployment insurance, for example, would to a limited extent and for a very limited time act as an offset. Conceivably, a sharp decline in military spending, if there were no financial collapse accompanying it, would reduce interest rates and thus perhaps stimulate construction and some types of state and municipal investment. A reduction in taxes would generate consumer demand. A rise in the federal social welfare program would have its effect. But it is by no means obvious that these counteractions would have anywhere near the same impact on the economy as defense spending.

Economists are to a large measure captives of the neat models they create, and they consequently ignore strategic dynamic elements which keep the economy going. For example, they tend to underestimate, if not ignore, the special effects of persistent inflation on business practices regarding inventory accumulation and investment in plant and equipment. Even more important is the almost total neglect of the influence of stock market and real estate speculation on (a) business investment decisions, and (b) the buoyancy of the especially important luxury trades. Inflation and speculation—partners of militarism—have been key triggers of our postwar prosperity, and they are too easily ignored as economists blandly transfer a block of GNP from one category to another, as if such transfers are made in the economy as simply as one keeps accounts.

The experience of the last depression still remains a challenge to economists to come up with an explanation of the way in which the economy operates in reality. For example, consider where we stood in 1939 after ten years of depression. Personal consumption expenditures had finally climbed to a new high—6 percent above 1929 in constant prices. Yet, at the same time, nonresidential fixed investment expenditures were 42 percent below the level of 1929, and residential construction was 20 percent below.[23] Despite six years of rising

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consumer spending, and the start of orders flowing in from France and England for rearming, the investment community was still in a state of depression, and over 17 percent of the labor force was unemployed.

In this connection, it is important to recognize that one of the major attributes of the huge military spending in the postwar years is its concentration in the producers durable field and the stimulation it gives to the demand for machinery and equipment. If we combine the spending for producers durable goods resulting from the military with private spending for the same type of goods, we find the following: 36 percent of the output of the producers durable goods industries is purchased directly or indirectly by the federal government.[24] (These data are for 1963, before the impact of the Vietnam War.) It is here, I suggest, that we find the unique role of military spending in raising and sustaining production and employment at new highs.

There are, to be sure, other impacts of defense spending that help to explain the magnitude and structure of the postwar economy: the unique role of research stimulated and financed by military and space programs; the special place of defense spending in nurturing the growth and prosperity of key giant industrial and financial enterprises; the support given by U.S. military power to acceptance of the U.S. dollar as an international currency;[25] the ease with which military orders can be fed into the economy in spurts which act as adrenalin injections to the private sector.

At the least, it can be concluded, economic theory and analysis which omit imperialism and militarism from their underlying paradigm are far removed from the reality of today's world. More realistically, it can be said that they operate to obscure the truth about the great problems and dangers of the second half of the twentieth century.

NOTES

1. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital.* New York, 1964, pp. 452-453.
2. Quincy Wright, *A Study of War.* Chicago, 1942, vol. I, p. 236.

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3. Calculated from list in Lawrence Dennis, *Operational Thinking for Survival.* Colorado Springs, 1969, appendix II.
4. Office of Naval Intelligence, *The United States Navy as an Industrial Asset.* Washington, D.C., 1923, p. 4.
5. Calculated from data in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957.* Washington, D. C., 1961, pp. 718-719.
6. Richard W. Van Alstyne, *The Rising American Empire.* Chicago, 1965.
7. *Ibid.,* chap. 5, "Manifest Destiny and Empire, 1820-1870."
8. Quincy Wright, *op cit.,* vol. I, p. 299.
9. Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World.* New York, 1962, p. 206.
10. The isolationism was usually more apparent than real. See William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* New York, 1962, chap. 4, "The Legend of Isolationism."
11. Thorstein Veblen, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," in *Essays in Our Changing Order.* New York, 1934, p. 464.
12. In a letter from Marx to Engels, October 8, 1858, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Correspondence 1846-1895.* New York, 1934, p. 117.
13. Quincy Wright, *op. cit.,* pp. 670-671.
14. The data on military expenditures are the purchases of goods and services for "national defense" and "space research and technology" as used in computing Gross National Product. The 1964 and 1968 data are reported in the *Survey of Current Business,* July 1968 and July 1969. The adjustment for price changes was made by using the implicit price deflators for federal purchases of goods and services, as given in the *Economic Report of the President,* January 1969.
15. General David M. Shoup, "The New American Militarism," *The Atlantic,* April 1969. The figure of 119 countries seems too large. General Shoup was probably including bases on island locations, which he counted as separate countries. Our guess is that U.S. armed forces to man bases, administer military assistance, and train foreign officers are located in 70 to 80 countries.
16. *New York Times,* April 9, 1969.
17. George Thayer, *The War Business, The International Trade in Armaments.* New York, 1969, pp. 37-38. This is a summary of data presented in *Military Assistance Facts,* May 1, 1966, brought up-to-date through Fiscal Year 1968.
18. For (a), see *ibid.* (b), see John Dunn, *Military Aid and Military Elites: The Political Potential of American Training and Technical Assistance Programs.* Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1961. (c), see Edwin Lieuwen, *The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America.* Ohio, 1966, p. 16.
19. Data on armed services and Defense Department civilian employment from *Defense Indicators* (Bureau of the Census), November 1969. The estimate of the number employed by private industry for military production is based on Richard P. Oliver's study, "The Employment Effect of Defense Expenditures," *Monthly Labor Review,* September 1967. Mr. Oliver estimated 2.972 million employed in private industry in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967 as a result of Defense Department expenditures. We brought this estimate up to date by (1) assuming no increase in productivity or major change in the com-

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position of production since fiscal year 1967; (2) using the expenditure data for the first three quarters of 1969; (3) adding space research and technology and one half of Atomic Energy Commission expenditures, both of which had been excluded in Mr. Oliver's estimates; and (4) adjusting for price increases in the last two years. The resulting figure of 3.5 million is therefore a broad estimate, but the margin of error is not such as in any way to invalidate our analysis.

20. Based on data in *Employment and Earnings* (Bureau of Labor Statistics), January to November 1969. The 3.7 million estimate represents the full-time unemployed plus the full-time equivalent of those who were working involuntarily less than a full week. This estimate does not take into account the unemployed who are not counted in the government survey.
21. *Economic Report of the President,* January 1969. Washington, D.C., 1969, p. 252.
22. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Economic Impacts of Disarmament,* Washington, D.C., 1962.
23. *Economic Report of the President,* January 1969, p. 228.
24. Calculated from tables in "Input-Output Structure of the U.S. Economy: 1963," *Survey of Current Business,* November 1969. The percent of direct and indirect output attributable to (a) gross private fixed capital formation and (b) federal government purchases were used. These percentages were applied to the gross output of each of the industries manufacturing durable goods. It is generally estimated that 85 percent of federal government purchases are for the military. The figure is probably higher for durable goods manufacturing industries alone.
25. Given the inadequate U.S. gold reserves, the U.S. dollar can serve as an international currency only as long as foreign banks are willing to keep dollar credit balances in the United States as a substitute for gold payments. It is interesting that former Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Robert Roosa included the military strength of the United States as a factor in maintaining the present international monetary system: "Moreover, the political stability and enormous economic and military strength of the United States have also increased the desirability of keeping balances here rather than in any other country in the world." (Robert V. Roosa, *Monetary Reform for the World Economy,* New York, 1965, p. 9.)

Private property based on the labor of the small proprietor, free competition, democracy, i.e., all the catchwords with which the capitalists and their press deceive the workers and the peasants, are things of the past. Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries.

—Lenin, *Imperialism*

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN PERU?

BY JAMES PETRAS AND
NELSON RIMENSNYDER

This is an abridged version of a chapter that will appear in James Petras's new book, *Politics and Social Structure in Latin America,* which will be published in the summer of 1970 by Monthly Review Press. Footnote references have been omitted but will of course be included in the book. Professor Petras is the Director of Latin American Development Studies at the Institute of Public Administration, Pennsylvania State University; and Nelson Rimensnyder is a Research Associate in the same program.—The Editors.

For the first time in Peruvian history a serious effort to develop a modern industrial capitalist society is being undertaken. A military government closely linked to nationalist professional groups has promulgated a broad program that includes substantive changes in the system of land tenure and target areas for public and private investments.

The military government has set itself a number of strategic economic goals:

a) The establishment of a dynamic, capitalist, industrial society in which public and private Peruvian entrepreneurs will play a dominant role.

b) The incorporation of the peasantry into the market economy through the expropriation of the large traditional haciendas of the sierras and the distribution of land to the peasants.

c) The exclusion of those foreign firms whose behavior violates the political rules and economic guidelines established to foster national industrial development.

d) The transfer of private capital from agriculture to non-agricultural pursuits, especially in the secondary sector.

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The military government is clearly *developmental* in its orientation, earnest effort at redistributive policies such as the agrarian reform being subordinated to the overall effort to provide inducements for future industrial growth. Likewise *nationalist* policies such as the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, largely served to provide the junta with an issue attracting great popular support. Policies regarding concessions to foreign investors both in the exploitation of minerals and manufacturing suggest that the junta is largely concerned with integrating foreign-owned resources and enterprises into a broader national development perspective. The *populist* concerns of the junta are mainly directed toward socio-economic improvement of the peasantry without permitting its effective mobilization. Land reform will be carried out and administered largely by government-appointed agrarian officials (*técnicos*). Independent activities which the peasants might take on their own behalf will not meet with the approval of the junta. Activities of the industrial working class which revolve around traditional class organizations and issues are treated as threats to the industrial-development orientation of the junta. Paternalistic projects involving profit-sharing and "co-participation" in management are counterposed to the politics of class struggle. The junta has moved to depoliticize the universities and create a professional, technically oriented university.

In sum, the horses of populism and nationalism are hitched to the cart of developmentalism. The politics of capitalist modernization-from-above in the framework of a colonial economy require the junta to place restrictions and controls on the economic activities of both the traditional Peruvian elite and the foreign investors established in their mineral-based economic enclaves. At the same time the junta must limit the opportunities of the Left in order to maintain and direct the process of social change, especially the transfer of property, and to limit the extent of change. While resisting pressures from the advanced capitalist countries that would distort development priorities, the junta must also provide incentives and a favorable investment climate in the urban industrial areas: hence

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the need to maintain a docile and "managed" labor force. Paradoxically, in carrying out policies designed to produce a modern capitalist industrial society, the military must overcome the opposition of the center of world capitalism and the reservations of its own entrepreneurial elite.

Internationally it is the Communist countries, including the Soviet Union and Cuba, and domestically the Peruvian Communist Party which have shown the greatest enthusiasm for the policies of capitalist modernization-from-above. The policies of the military junta can best be understood by examining the interplay between recent Peruvian political history and the process of political socialization of the officer corps—the strategic policy-making elite in Peru today.

Background: Recent Political History

The first indications that Peru's military men differed from traditional Latin American military *caudillos* appeared during the military government of 1962-1963. Most commentators believed that the assumption of power was precipitated by fear of an imminent APRA victory in the 1962 presidential elections, the military being portrayed as the defender of the old order against the "populist" APRA. This account fails to deal with two facts: APRA had several years earlier come to terms with the traditional ruling class, and the military had changed both in its ideas and social composition.

Reasons much deeper and more complex than the old military-Aprista hatreds account for the military coup. The younger military men in Peru's armed forces were becoming impatient with the policies and actions of the ruling civilian elites. Development-oriented and well aware of Peru's extreme inequalities of wealth and income, they were increasingly apprehensive over the possibility of a violent revolution emanating from the country's economically depressed and politically excluded rural and urban poor.

The main purpose of Peru's military government of 1962-1963 was to assure the election of a civilian president who would develop unused resources, alleviate some of the inequities of Peru's socio-economic structure, and restrain the growing

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revolutionary movement centered in the rural areas. Radical structural changes affecting the prerogatives and privileges of the elites were not objectives of the officers who ruled in that short-lived (ten months) government. The men who headed the military junta of 1962-1963 were close to retirement and were acting to some extent under the influence of junior staff officers who were largely the products of different social and educational experiences. Many of these younger officers would later surface as the generals who are influential in the present junta.

This was the background of the new elections of June 1963, in which Fernando Belaúnde Terry was elected President. During his five years in office Belaúnde made no attempt to bring about basic changes in Peru's socio-economic structure, and his reform efforts within the framework of the system failed to achieve significant results. In fact, the agrarian reform enacted in 1964 did not even keep pace with population growth, some 40,000 families being added during his period in office to the million landless peasant families (40 percent of the total population) which already existed. Large external debts were contracted; loose financial policies led to severe inflation and currency devaluation; and massive corruption was routine among high government officials. These were all factors contributing to the military coup which overthrew the Belaúnde government on October 3, 1968.

The assumption of total executive and legislative power by the present military junta signalled a shift from an impotent middle-class government to a military regime which is also rooted in the middle class but which is committed to overcoming the stalemates in the political system which had blocked the emergence of a new and dynamic approach to economic development.

The social mobility and relatively high educational level of the members of the Revolutionary Military Government, as it is officially styled, are important factors in understanding its policy orientation. The President, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, comes from a middle-class family of modest means. He enlisted in the army as a private in 1929, as did at least one

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other member of the government, was selected the following year to attend the Chorillos Military School, and graduated first in his class. All of the fourteen cabinet ministers graduated from one of the three Peruvian military academies during the late 1930s or early 1940s. Several members of the government were contemporaries at Chorillos, and two were roommates. Many returned to Chorillos as administrators or instructors during their subsequent military careers. Only two members of the government came from upper-class families, and few married outside their social background, which was almost exclusively middle-class. All of this suggests that we are dealing with a homogeneous, close-knit "generational group."

More important from the point of view of intellectual influences was the common experience shared by more than half the fifteen members of the government who attended special courses in the 1950s at the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM). Both the subject-matter and the instructors had a profound effect on the evolution of their political consciousness. From their course work came their commitment to developing and changing Peruvian society. Together with their middle-class status, this experience moved them in the direction of a bourgeois revolution from above. For it was at CAEM that the future rulers of Peru were exposed to courses on Peru's socio-economic structures, the dependent nature of its economy, and the vulnerability of internal development to external fluctuations. For the most part these courses were taught by left-wing nationalist academics who were well-informed about the problems of Peruvian socio-economic development. Many members of the current military government maintain their links with their former professors. More recent graduates of CAEM continue to receive the same education and to keep up the pressure for change. President Velasco has often sought legal advice from left-wing nationalist elements, of whom the best known is the President of the Bar Association, Alberto Ruiz Eldredge.

Politics and Development Strategy

Possessing an awareness of the historical processes which produced the present social structure and the attendant impedi-

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ments to industrial development, the military has come to view the traditional political institutions as incapable of carrying out necessary changes and is unwilling to entrust leadership of this revolution-from-above to the civilian politicians, legislature, or elected government. In early August 1969, the military government announced that it would remain in power "until at least 1975," in order to guarantee that Peru will be well on the way to accomplishing the goals of the twenty-year development plan which the new government unveiled in November 1968, one month after assuming power.

The twenty-year plan, known as *The Strategy for Peru's Long-Range National Development,* reflects the government's major preoccupation: rapid industrial development and the prerequisite social reforms necessary to assure such development. The plan enumerates five basic reforms: (1) expropriation of all large landed estates; (2) a new mining policy to include more public participation, regulation, and control in integrating Peru's mineral resources into the national economy; (3) an industrialization policy designed to reduce Peru's imports and increase exports, especially in the growing South American regional market; (4) reorganization of public administration, recruiting personnel on the basis of technical competence, to create a more efficient instrument for implementing development policies; and (5) fiscal reform. The plan does not envision wholesale nationalization but, rather, selective takeovers by the state and inducements to existing entrepreneurs to expand their activities. Over a twenty-year period the junta hopes to realize the following objectives: a greatly enlarged and expanding internal market; a more balanced geographical distribution of population; structural changes that will eliminate present institutional obstacles to development; expanded infrastructure; a more equitable distribution of national income and a doubling of per capita income; subordination of external investment to national development policies; less economic dependence and vulnerability to external forces.

The language of the development plan suggests that the military government is not going to preside over a development strategy limited by rigid guidelines or one to be accomplished

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in the space of a few years. In fact, an examination of the government's rhetoric, goals, and accomplishments over the past year provides us with some basis for determining the implications current behavior might have for radical social change and significant economic development.

One week after coming to power the new government expropriated the International Petroleum Company, announcing that no compensation would be granted and charging IPC with extracting oil from Peru since 1924 under illegal agreements. The expropriation had two immediate results: it created instant popular support for the military government, and it incurred the hostility of the United States. A U.S.-Peruvian confrontation developed over the threatened implementation of the Hickenlooper Amendment, under the terms of which all U.S. government economic aid to Peru would be cut off if IPC was not compensated. Additional pressure existed in the threat to cut off Peru's sugar quota, a move which would have serious repercussions on the country's economy.

The popular support generated by the nationalist action gave the government an opportunity to consolidate its power, purge itself of conservative dissidents, and initiate its program of development-from-above within a tranquil and favorable internal environment. The Nixon administration, seeking to avoid a confrontation that might radicalize the junta, decided not to apply the economic sanctions; instead, it has chosen to negotiate, hoping to utilize indirect pressures for a settlement of the IPC compensation demands. Since April 1969 when negotiations began, the Peruvian military has remained adamant—no compensation. Nor have there been any overt indications that Peru would consider compensation in exchange for increased U.S. economic aid or private investment pledges. Apparently the military government is confident that the Hickenlooper threat is past. In early August the Peruvian press reported that the whole affair has been a "meaningless bluff and a most unhappy example of political blackmail." In a speech on July 28, 1969, President Velasco said that his government considered the case closed and that future decrees affecting the conduct of foreign capital in Peru could be expected. He spoke of the

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negative role which unrestrained foreign capital had played in Latin American development, pointing out that Peru and the rest of Latin America are net exporters of capital and that income earned in Latin America finances the development of the highly industrialized nations. He then defined his government's attitude as follows:

> This unacceptable situation must be overcome. Latin American development needs foreign capital. But this capital does not come for philanthropic reasons. It is worthwhile for it to come here. There is, therefore, a mutual convenience which must be clearly and justly normalized for benefit of both parties. So foreign capital must act within the legal bounds of our countries under rules which guarantee the just participation of our countries in the wealth which they and their men produce.

But the act of the government to date that could, if fully implemented, have the most profound affect on Peru's social structure and economic development is the agrarian reform (Law concessions will no longer be permitted under old laws: all new contracts are to be negotiated on "fixed profit" terms; all concessions are to include provisions for state participation and profit sharing. In addition, all existing foreign- and domestic-controlled concessions can be subjected to renegotiation for terms more favorable to the government.

But the act of the government to date that could, if fully implemented, have the most profound affect on Peru's social structure and economic development is the agrarian reform (Law 17716). Since this law was decreed (on June 24, 1969), 66,000 hectares (hectare = 2.47 acres) of the coastal sugar lands were placed under government administration, pending the completion of expropriation procedures and the formation of cooperatives. The cooperatives will be under government supervision and will function as state enterprises. The large sugar estates along the coast and in the sierra affected by the law include those owned by wealthy Peruvian families and private foreign interests such as W. R. Grace & Co. of the United States. All associated sugar-processing facilities and installations on the plantations are marked for expropriation. The agrarian reform is being carried out "without prejudice or favor," at least along the

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coast, in order to "end once and for all the unfair social order that has kept peasants in poverty and inequity." If the military government fully implements the agrarian reform, the large cotton plantations and sierra cattle and sheep operations will also be affected. The one major non-sugar-growing sierra estate so far expropriated by the military government is the 247,000-hectare cattle and sheep ranch operated by the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company. The Cerro corporation received $490,000 in cash compensation for the installations on the land. The sum of $1,800,000 has been paid for 90,000 head of livestock. Twenty-year bonds were issued as payment for the land. This expropriation, however, was officially carried out in January of 1969, prior to the present law, under the authority and provisions of the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law. The property is to be divided among the peasants working the land, who are to operate the farms cooperatively. This was the first expropriation activity in the agrarian sector undertaken by the military government and it had wide national support. This may have been a pilot project designed to test the response of antagonists and protagonists in the public at large toward radical agrarian reform.

Subsequently the government decided to expropriate the large, efficient, modern sugar plantations on the coast, an economically powerful and politically influential sector of the Peruvian power structure. The Agrarian Reform Law was applied there immediately, but application was slower in the sierra. So far little opposition has materialized from the large sugar growers of the coast. The reason may be that for some time sugar interests have been transferring their investments to other sectors of the economy. Implementation of the agrarian reform on the coast allows for smooth and rapid channeling of compensation bond payments into the more modern private sectors of the economy. Records show that forty-four major *latifundistas* of the coast now have substantial investments in Peruvian mutual stock funds, the construction industry, insurance and savings companies, mining, public utilities, transportation, and in the mass communications media. The government is counting on the demonstration effect of the successful and peaceful coastal ex-

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propriations to make things easier when the sierra is hit with expropriations. In any case this strategy will effectively isolate the landed elite and inhibit a united opposition from acting in concert. The clear intention of the junta's agrarian-reform law is to encourage capital investment in industry and mining. Under arrangements for compensation payment, most bonds can be readily converted to cash if they are immediately invested in Peruvian enterprises designated by the government, thus preventing capital outflow and encouraging industrialization. The exact manner in which this important provision of the law will be carried out remains to be seen.

Along with the agrarian reform, changes occurred in ministerial personnel. On June 13, 1969, President Velasco demanded the resignation of the conservative Minister of Agriculture, General José Benavides. The initial appointment of Benavides was viewed by many in Peru, including high officials in the Office of Agrarian Reform (ONRA), as an indication that the military government was not seriously concerned with agrarian change. Benavides was closely associated with members of the National Agrarian Society, the association of large landowners, and expressed strong opposition to large-scale expropriation of land. He was a source of continued irritation to other members of the government including General Jorge Fernández Maldonado, the Minister of Energy and Mining, who, soon after his appointment, became the spokesman of the "radical" sector within the government. Benavides was replaced by one of the "radicals," General Jorge Barandiarán Pagador.

Other measures instituted to implement economic and social goals include reform of the banking system, water rights, and public administration. Banks incorporated in Peru must now be controlled by Peruvian citizens. The Water Code Decree (Law 17752) of July 1969 makes all water (no matter what its source) state property and establishes a water-control authority to coordinate water-resource utilization with the agrarian-reform program and general economic development policies. Administrative changes have been most apparent at the ministry level.

All of these reforms, plus others which have been an-

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nounced as forthcoming, reflect the military government's dual policy of initiating modernization yet remaining firmly in control of the political situation. The latter can best be seen in the new University Law. Issued in early March during the annual university summer break, its purpose is twofold: to make higher education relevant to the development needs of the country, and to eliminate political activity on the campuses. Professors have been divided on the law, some supporting it and others publicly and privately denouncing it. Student leaders have been highly critical, yet efforts to organize effective protest have been quickly suppressed by police and university administrative action.

Under the University Law all universities are to maintain their autonomy in administrative, financial, and academic matters, but will no longer have the right of "extra-territoriality" in matters concerning "threats to public order." This means that police and military personnel may now freely enter the university grounds and buildings, make arrests, and intervene in "riotous and mutinous situations." The law in effect destroys all semblance of university autonomy. In addition, university administrations have the authority to expel students who engage in or organize political activities. Prior to this law a university administration had to request and receive permission from the University Council, composed of administration, faculty, and students, before expelling a student for non-academic reasons. The clear intention of the junta is to "depoliticize" the university, in this way removing a possible source of left-wing opposition to continued military-directed modernization programs.

External Obstacles to Development

In implementing its plan to modernize and industrialize Peru within a capitalist economic system under domestic and not foreign control, the military government has been confronted by numerous external obstacles. It has expended considerable time and energy in its efforts to overcome or remove these impediments to the execution of its development policies. One of the most crippling obstacles concerns repayment of Peru's

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massive foreign debt.

Under Belaúnde, Peru's foreign debt climbed to $847 million, 70 percent of which must be paid off over a four-year period beginning in 1970. The principal creditors are the United States ($200 million), West Germany ($157 million), Italy ($87 million), France ($52 million), followed by Great Britain, Spain, and Japan.

Peru's Treasury Minister, General Morales Bermúdez, has made trips to the United States and European capitals in an attempt to obtain extensions of the payment period. During his July-August 1969 trip Morales Bermúdez visited various European capitals trying to win support for his plan for refinancing Peru's payment schedule over a ten-year period. The principal motivation for seeking an extension appears to be the long-range development plans of the military government rather than the country's short-range financial situation. As of August the reserves of the Banco Central exceeded $110 million and the balance of payments has jumped from a deficit of $17 million in the year ending June 30, 1968, to a surplus of $30 million in the period ending June 30, 1969.

So far, however, the Treasury Minister has failed to secure agreements allowing for the refinancing of the debt because of the fears of the international financial community. Despite some offers from foreign investors, primarily interested in obtaining concessions in the mining sector, little positive aid was forthcoming from the capitalist world. U.S., German, French, and Italian financial and investor groups refused to consider refinancing current debts or further investments in existing companies in the absence of agreements guaranteeing the security of present and future investments. And the government's capitalist modernization effort was further delayed by the reluctance of U.S. mining companies to sign agreements to expand production and to develop facilities for refining ore in Peru.

Such, in general terms, was the situation that existed last fall. Negotiations with U.S. corporations, most notably with Southern Peru Copper Corporation (a consortium comprising American Smelting and Refining, Cerro, Phelps Dodge, and Newmont Mining), for new investments were proceeding but

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apparently getting nowhere. The ruling junta was therefore faced with a dilemma: Should they sacrifice their national development plan to meet the demands of foreign investors? Or should the attempt be made to locate alternative sources of capital through internal savings, creation of public enterprises, and closer relations with Communist countries?

During the fall months the government took a series of actions that seemed to reflect the pressures emanating from the more radical wing of the junta. Foreign investors in the mining sector were told to put unexploited concessions into operation within seven months or the government would repossess them. A suburban reform law was put into effect, providing for the rapid expropriation of suburban plots of land in order to eradicate the *barriadas* and to build private houses. If seriously applied, this program could signify a hard blow at real estate and banking interests. In addition, Vice Admiral Enrique Carbonell, considered a radical, joined the junta. He was the one responsible for exposing IPC's illegal remission of $11 million shortly after its expropriation by the junta, resulting in the downfall of two of its "moderate" members.

In September the government severely restricted imports, virtually prohibiting all luxury items and goods which compete with domestic production. And it established a state monopoly over the importation of meat and dairy products to end speculation in the market for foodstuffs.

At about the same time the government announced that an important Soviet mission, headed by a vice minister, would be arriving in Peru to study the possibility of a vast program of irrigation in the northern desert plains. Moreover, the government appeared to be relaxing its authoritarian posture regarding popular demands. For example, it decreed that striking workers of Cerro de Pasco be awarded a raise 23 percent greater than that offered by the company, an action which was strongly denounced by the business community as "demagogic."

In the event, however, these signs and symptoms turned out to be misleading. Behind the scenes a struggle was taking place within the junta. Minister of Development Maldonado represented the political wing which favored the promotion of

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economic development through heavy state intervention, largely via public corporations and public loans. Minister of Economy and Finance Francisco Morales Bermúdez belonged to that wing most anxious to promote development through agreements with U.S. investors. These differences apparently came to a head in the discussions surrounding the exploitation of Peru's rich copper deposits in Cuajone (a reserve estimated at 450 million tons). As already noted, an agreement with the Southern Peru Copper company had been under negotiation for months, with the outcome being held up pending the settlement of the struggle inside the junta. The denouement finally came in late December 1969, with a victory for Francisco Morales Bermúdez and the pro-imperialist sector of the junta. Under the terms of this agreement, Southern Peru contracts to invest $355 million in expanding copper production.

But more important, the new agreement signals a definitive rapprochement with the U.S. government and brings to an end the nationalist phase of the junta's activity. Coincidental with the copper agreement, the agrarian reform has slowed down. The political rapprochement with the U.S. and the signing of the copper agreement serve as a guarantee for the rest of the international investment community that Peru is, after all, safe for capitalist exploitation.

It thus appears that the hopes aroused by the expropriation of IPC and the rhetoric surrounding the agrarian reform were premature if not altogether ill-founded. In the month prior to the copper agreement nine members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) were arrested for "subversion," and a revolutionary socialist leader, Ricardo Gadea, was sentenced to five years in prison.

The military junta has clearly taken the path of development through subordination to foreign investment; in the next period it will probably sacrifice development for external support to stay in power. Splits among the military may occur; "national-populists" will have the choice of capitulating before the "rightist" course chosen by Velasco or of breaking discipline, turning to the people, and struggling to reverse the policy of development through subordination.

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PAUL NIZAN: PHILOSOPHER OF REVOLUTION

BY ANDREW FEENBERG

No one left to deceive. No one left to seduce.
Only blows to receive and blows to give.

Paul Nizan's *Les chiens de garde** (The Watchdogs) expresses a recurring mood of youth in the modern world. It is the mood of Turgeniev's "sons," the mood of those without excuses, of those for whom neutrality is betrayal, for whom the clean separation of culture and life is a scandal. The sons refuse the fathers' world because not to refuse it is to join it, and to join it is to embrace its consequences. The logic of rebellion begins thus.

Where the elders speak of future tasks, the sons see only past failures. Where the elders seek compromise, the sons demand principles. Where the elders celebrate humanistic culture, the sons reject it as a mark of privilege and an instrument of oppression. This mood is dangerous and leads men to commit dangerous acts. It cost Russia a Czar and, more recently, France a president. Its cost for America is still uncertain.

Nizan is rooted in the struggles of the depression of the 1930s, and the idealistic culture of a great European nation in decline. His rebellion presupposes a revolutionary proletariat and

Andrew Feenberg is an assistant professor of philosophy at San Diego State College.

* (Paris: Rieder, 1932; Paris: Maspero, 1965.)

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a particular cultural pantheon, neither of which has exact counterparts in this country. But we are familiar with the topology of his world. Nizan's book could have been, should have been, written by a young American, for although much is different here, the same fundamental dilemma prevails.

In a world brutally divided into masters and slaves, it is necessary, at last, to confess publicly a long-hidden alliance with the masters or openly to take up the side of the slaves. No place remains for the impartiality of the intellectuals. There is now only the struggle of partisans.

See how close he is to our mood. Nizan criticizes a society which professes ideals, but which leaves ruin and misery in its wake. Nizan demands the partisan spirit of commitment from ivory-tower intellectuals. Nizan rejects the cloistered culture of the specialists of the myth of the Good for a culture of the streets and their struggles. Nizan betrays his class so as not to betray man and joins the ranks of the oppressed.

Nizan says, as we could, that "false debate between our former masters and ourselves no doubt comes from the fact that we have no hope of convincing them, while they are hopeful about us. It is unimportant to touch them. They must be vanquished." For Nizan, the break in the continuity of generations is only a reflection of the opposition of masters and slaves in the society. History speaks no differently to us.

Nizan is a Marxist in the style of the young Marx. His references are not to *Capital* but to the early works, particularly to the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Nizan does not claim to have a science. He is a philosopher who proposes "not to interpret the world, but to change it." He says: "The philosopher is now merely the specialist of the demands, the protests, known by the exploited. He will patiently elaborate the techniques of liberation."

Nizan is wholly possessed by the partisan spirit of proletarian revolution, by the public spirit of revolutionary humanism. He demands that ideas become weapons, thoughts arms in the struggle. For he recognizes that the bourgeoisie is also armed with thoughts, thoughts that are designed to produce acquiescence and patience in the oppressed. Nizan chooses to voice the aspirations of the oppressed, in order that they may listen to

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the voice of their own misery and revolt. Following the young Marx, Nizan claims for revolutionary philosophy the power of a material force, when it seizes the masses.

Nizan's humanism is militant. It is the self-affirmation of those who are nothing, not the elaboration of an "idea of man." He begins by observing the contradiction between the promises of bourgeois humanism and its realizations. Universal justice, freedom, equality, the dignity and rights of man: What have these ideas to do with subsistence wages, strike-breaking, colonial oppression? Nizan insists that abstraction cannot be made from the horrors of colonialism, the poverty of the working class, the injustices experienced by all those without fortune under capitalism. These things cannot be mere exceptions to the general rule, occasions for progress, or, worse still, exaggerations.

What is essential for bourgeois thought—that among the bourgeoisie the ideals do in fact have some application, pacifying bourgeois existence—is for Nizan no evidence of human progress toward the widest possible realization of freedom, justice, and equality. On the contrary, the fact that an economically privileged sector of the society also monopolizes these rights is evidence that their application is inherently limited under capitalism. Where the bourgeoisie sees progress, Nizan sees limits; where the bourgeoisie excuses or denies these limits, Nizan denounces its hypocrisy.

To be for man in a society which militates against the freedom and happiness of the great majority of men, is to militate against that society. The "impartial" and "balanced" judgment of such a society is already a refusal of its realities, which are not balanced and impartial but overwhelmingly favor the bourgeoisie. Nizan demands that accounts be settled; he withdraws the moral credit of the bourgeoisie; he proclaims its bankruptcy.

Here he leaves the terrain of bourgeois thought altogether. There is no longer any question of demanding progress of this society. He concludes that capitalism has been tried and found wanting. In this case, it is no longer the task of humanism to appeal to the bourgeoisie for humanity but to recognize that man can only realize himself against the bourgeoisie.

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For Nizan, Marxist humanism is not a continuation of bourgeois ideals in a new form, but a radical change of element, an abandonment of the realm of ideals for that of concrete reality. Bourgeois humanism is attacked as the fig leaf of oppression and the moral tool of class domination. The only humanism worthy of the name is, then, the articulation of the inhumanity of bourgeois society, the negation of its inhumanity in theory and in practice. Humanism can no longer parade the ideals of universal humanity, but must identify itself with the struggle for humanity of those who are dehumanized by the society. Humanism is thus negative and critical, embodied not in celebration but in indignation, not in thought alone but also in action, not in spirit but in flesh.

This change in element, from the ideal to the real, is not motivated by thought, but by life itself. "I simply say that I do not like the position of subjugation. I do not ask Reason if I am right. Although I do believe that my opponents are wrong—objectively wrong, as they would put it in their jargon." Mutilated life, not "Being," "Mind," or "Truth," speaks in the person of the revolutionary philosopher. His starting point is not a thought but a fact, the fact of slavery and the felt need for its destruction.

Philosophy begins for Nizan with damnation. He who thinks in hell cannot be expected to contemplate his tormentors in the light of universal Reason, impartially and objectively. Nor need he do so. His thought presupposes not a world to explain, but a world to change, and the problems he faces are not merely theoretical, but practical as well. Here in hell, thought is not liberated by leisure and comfort from the cares of this world, but is still servant to necessity, the very same necessity which dictates the revolution of the damned.

And to the damned, the narrow technicalities of bourgeois philosophy seem blind and insolent. Either the existence of slavery poses a problem for a free man or it does not, and no one can expect a slave to care about those who do not care about his slavery. If philosophy wishes to shut out life, to toy with the "idea" of freedom, the "idea" of justice, never once turning its attention to those whose struggle for real freedom

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and justice is a matter of life and death, then those in struggle may properly ignore philosophy. The professionalization of philosophy, its loss of audience, is the direct consequence of its secret commitment to the bourgeoisie.

It is not a self-evidence of Reason that the only appropriate place for the theory of freedom is beside those struggling for its realization, but it is nevertheless self-evident. In the face of this self-evidence, how light is the weight of weighty speculations irrelevant to the struggle!

If we have in common with Nizan this passion for a partisan truth, a truth of struggle, we are still divided from him by our special situation. For Nizan could attack the cultural hegemony of the bourgeoisie in a society threatened by the political rivalry of capital and labor. We cannot. Where Nizan could join a party, we have none. Where Nizan could enter a powerful movement of the oppressed in his own country, we have at best been able to support those in other countries struggling against our own.

Nizan says, "There is no question of doing something for the workers. But with them. To be a voice among their voices. And not the voice of Intellect." But we cannot be a "voice among their voices," for the triumph of bourgeois ideology is so complete in America that no important working-class movement opposes the society. Only the blacks are concerned to break the cultural hegemony of the bourgeoisie, and *that* they wish to do without us.

Thus in spite of the interest of Nizan's work, it would be wrong for young Americans to see in it a clear expression of their own situation. Our opponents can sarcastically ask us for whom are we fighting, who are those oppressed that we keep talking about. No one could have said the same to Nizan.

Yet there are in this society millions who qualify as "oppressed," who are not included by the freedom, justice, and equality of the society; and beyond our borders there are millions more who suffer our domination. There is indeed no revolutionary movement in the United States, but this country hardly gives the lie to Nizan's denunciation of capitalism's inhumanity.

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But it is not so much these American oppressed who determine young Americans to take the path which Nizan took in other circumstances. We cannot point to a revolutionary working class, but we are confronted with one hard fact nevertheless: the struggle of the Vietnamese people. In the face of that fact no excuses can be offered, no compromises made. In the face of that fact thousands of young people have decided to challenge the inhumanity of this society.

It is still unclear if among the oppressed of this country a movement will arise to affirm man, but because of Vietnam there are thousands trying to create such a movement. This locates us precisely with respect to Nizan. This much may be granted to the critics: we cannot speak "with" the oppressed in America. But because of Vietnam, we have discovered that we must speak with the Vietnamese, and in the name of the oppressed of this country, in the hope that they will soon find their own voice.

"Who are the masters of perception?" Nizan asks. Who convinces the oppressed to see their oppression as freedom, their misery as necessary and justified? The student movement exists in this country to ask this question of the oppressed.

Thus the American "sons" are far more nearly comparable to those of nineteenth century Russia than to Nizan's generation. Trotsky's description of early Russian opposition movements comes close to describing the situation in America today. "At first the aristocratic intelligentsia substituted itself for the 'rabble,' then the plebeian populists substituted themselves for the peasantry; finally, the Marxist intelligentsia substituted itself for the proletariat. . . . Thus, throughout our history the intelligentsia's role as ideological standard-bearer was connected with the country's political life not through the class which it wanted to serve but merely through the 'idea' of that class. So it was with the first Marxist circles among us. Only very gradually did the spirit become flesh."*

But then, by an irony of history, the party of flesh is an idea of the spirit and the commitment to revolution finds those

* *Partisan Review*, vol. 25, no. 4, p. 597.

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to be liberated indifferent to freedom. How to pass from the idea of a revolutionary movement to the reality? Unlike Nizan, we are faced here with the same problem as the bourgeoisie, but in a completely different context. Whereas the masters of the society cannot see the ideas of freedom and justice realized without themselves disappearing into the night of history, we can only live historically through the realization of the idea of a revolutionary movement. Still, from this point of view, how much simpler Nizan's gesture seems, how clear and rational his refusal of the society in which he lived compared with our own!

Then, lest we founder in this dialectic, the one hard fact we have at our disposal returns to mind: Vietnam.

There the struggle for freedom is not an idea. There history continues to call the bourgeoisie to account.

It is obvious that no preordained path can lead to the improbable victory of the oppressed in America. No promises can be made, no certainties offered. Some problems can only be resolved by the practice of life, and not by theory. Free to those so dedicated to struggle for a truth which is also a freedom, even where no theory assures the outcome of that struggle.

And yet, even though the outcome is uncertain, many tasks are clearly laid out already, and one of them is indicated and explored by Nizan. For if thought is to enter the real world as a material force, it must first oppose, as thought, the thought of that world. Where Nizan half apologized for combating the ideology of his enemies instead of their police, we need offer no apology.

The critique of the ideology, through which the society assures itself of the passive acquiescence of the population, is an attack on one of its instruments of domination. The partisan spirit demands this too, that thought become an arm in the struggle, that the refusal of a lifeless culture also take form as culture, but as a culture of life and revolt, a culture which, like that of Nizan, is constantly aware of its origin in life and need, itself alive only in the refusal of an inhuman world.

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MORE THOUGHTS ON THE MOVEMENT

BY JOHN McDERMOTT

This article is a sort of continuation of a piece entitled "Thoughts on the Movement," which appeared in *Viet Report* of September-October 1967 and has been extensively discussed and reprinted in the radical press. John McDermott is a regional organizer for New University Conference, a lecturer at MIT, fellow of the Cambridge Institute, and former associate editor of *Viet Report*.—The Editors.

I The Government

The United States has been defeated in Vietnam. At least, the Movement as well as the government believe so. Of course, few government officials have the temerity to use the word "defeat," but their policy belies the optimism of their utterances. The truth of the matter is that the Vietnamization of the war, today's official slogan, is precisely what the Saigon puppet regime had to be rescued from by U.S. troops in 1965. Saigon was incapable of ruling without U.S. bayonets in 1965, and it is equally (or, likely, more) incapable now.*

If this is the case, as it almost certainly is, why does the administration prolong the war? What can be gained by stretching out the defeat? What value is there in falsely maintaining

* There are, of course, elements within the government, particularly among the military, who would like to return to the Johnson strategy of military victory through attrition. And there is no doubt that the Nixon administration has made concessions to them. But this is not now the policy, as is shown by the (admittedly token) troop withdrawals. In the eyes of the military, a victory in Vietnam is possible but only if they are permitted not less than one million American soldiers.

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that we are winning a victory or, at least, staving off defeat? In short, why the delaying actions in Paris and in Vietnam?

The reason for the delaying can be readily surmised: for the government to acknowledge complete defeat in Vietnam and to withdraw very rapidly would have a number of damaging effects on the American Empire. These effects are shown clearly in the six main objectives the government has set itself to gain by delaying a settlement of the Vietnam War. Let me describe them.

First, the administration still hopes to achieve further face-saving. That is, it hopes to gain, in South Vietnam itself, some advantages which are beyond the reach of its military capacity —a portion of Vietnam where we will remain in charge, a base or two, say at Camranh Bay, a position of great influence in the postwar South Vietnamese government, and so on. All in all, however, I think opportunism of this sort is the least important of the reasons for the stalling in Paris and Vietnam.

Secondly, a very rapid exodus of U.S. power from Vietnam would create a good measure of diplomatic and political instability in Asia (and, for that matter, in other parts of the Third World). Many Asian governments, especially those of Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines, are kept in office largely by the presence of U.S. money and the threat of U.S. troops. They might begin to doubt our readiness to intervene in their behalf to protect them from their neighbors or, more realistically, from their own people. Hence, the less abrupt, clear, and dramatic the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the better; the more drawn out and, hence, obscured, the better.

Thirdly, the U.S. government is very anxious to discourage other revolutionary groups in other countries from imitating the Vietnamese. This is why we continue to increase U.S. air attacks against South Vietnam even at the present time. According to this reasoning, the more damage we do in South Vietnam, the better. The more indiscriminate that damage, the better. People must be taught that even when they defeat the U.S. Empire, they gain nothing but a bombed-over countryside at the cost of a decimated generation. Hence, delay in Paris while bombing in South Vietnam.

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Fourthly, if the dimensions of the defeat in Vietnam are too clear to the American people, their confidence in their leaders will fall even lower than it is at present. But, if this happens, other dominoes may begin to fall as well—support for NATO, for counterinsurgency in Latin America, for the policy of support for the Greek dictatorship, for the military budget, for the missile and space program, for the oversized CIA. (Some of these dominoes are already tottering.) God help the U.S. government if the American people looked at these things as critically as they do at Vietnam. Consequently, don't let people know how thorough the defeat really is. Delay, obscure, delay.

Fifthly, delaying also helps to obscure certain questions that would be raised if the fact of defeat were uppermost in people's minds. The public might ask critical questions about the men and women who got us into this. By any standards, the evidence is overwhelming that they were incompetent statesmen and inept generals. On the basis of their record of failure —failure even on their own terms—they deserve wholesale sacking. But who are *they?* Even the briefest review of the development of Vietnam policy indicates that *they* include most of the men and women who have directed U.S. foreign policy for the past twenty years or more—Presidents *and* Senators, Democrats *and* Republicans, military *and* civilians, top-level policymakers *and* middle-fry bureaucrats, government officials *and* corporate managers—in short, very nearly the whole foreign policy establishment. Delaying in Paris and Vietnam helps preclude the raising of such questions in the United States.

Further, when I was in South Vietnam in early 1967 it was common knowledge among company-grade officers of the First Air Cavalry Division and the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry Divisions that National Liberation Front soldiers taken prisoner by Americans were normally handed over to the Saigon Army which normally shot them. U.S. officers knew this but continued to hand over the prisoners, in explicit violation of what they knew to be the rules of war regarding prisoners. These officers are war criminals. So too are the officers and

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officials responsible for creating the five million involuntary civilian refugees in Vietnam, those responsible for the deliberately indiscriminate bombing and shelling in what are called the free-fire zones, those responsible for the use of gases and (in my opinion) defoliants, and those responsible for the Pacification Program, a program which is a nightmare of *gestapo* practices. All of these war crimes carry heavy penalties, including hanging. Delaying in Paris helps preclude questions like these too.

Further, U.S. officials have said that the reason they originally sent troops to Vietnam in March 1965 was that North Vietnamese troops were in the South. Now they admit that there were no, or very few, North Vietnamese in the South at that time. Thus sending our troops *provoked* North Vietnam into responding by sending hers. Similarly, it now appears that the first Tonkin Gulf incident was provoked by the Saigon government—with our foreknowledge—and that the second Tonkin Gulf incident never happened but was fabricated by the U.S. government to provide an excuse to bomb North Vietnam. The implication of both these events is that our government provoked the confrontation with the North. A very serious issue. (And one which has not yet been pursued far enough by the Fulbright Committee.)

Incompetent statesmen, inept generals, war crimes, conspiracy to provoke war—better keep issues like those muffled. Better therefore to obscure the Vietnam defeat. Better to delay.

Sixthly, and by far the most important in its own eyes, the administration would like to claim credit for extricating the U.S. from Vietnam. Every day's delay in the talks helps them in this, for then yesterday's promises of a U.S. military victory tend increasingly to be forgotten, the stunning Tet offensive of 1968 recedes into the background, and Paris itself more and more appears the main battlefield. In such a situation an agreement, almost any agreement, tends to be viewed as an administration victory, a victory brought off by—as James Reston or some such is sure to write—"the administration's patience, tenacity, and subtle combination of diplomacy and force." Consequently this objective too is aided by the delaying tactics in Paris and Vietnam.

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2 The Movement

What has been the organized Movement's response to this administration effort to limit the effects of the Vietnam defeat and turn the tactical defeat in Vietnam into a strategic victory elsewhere?* Most activists in the Movement, liberals as well as radicals, pacifists as well as socialists, seem to understand how important it is to help defeat the U.S. government on objectives #1, #2, and #3. All seem to agree that we don't want the administration to gain anything within Vietnam, face-saving or otherwise; most would like to see as much instability in the American Empire as possible; and, among radicals and socialists at least, we would like to see revolutionaries encouraged everywhere. But on the last three administration objectives, Movement people are very hazy. On these, radicals and socialists are just as hazy as liberals and pacifists, though for somewhat different reasons. What I want to argue is that on these last three objectives—restoring confidence in the establishment; precluding questions of incompetence, war-crimes, and conspiracy; and gaining credit for the end of the war—the administration must also be decisively defeated. In fact, my own view of the matter is that defeating the administration on these last three objectives is no less important than defeating it on the former three and, in the long run, is probably even more important.

The point at issue, of course, is that it is of paramount importance that the great mass of the people of this country win *their* victory in the Vietnam War, that is, that they defeat the administration's domestic objectives (#4, #5, and #6) and hence those of the ruling class, that they become fully aware of their victory and hence of their own collective strength, and that they explicitly recognize that it was the leadership of radicals and socialists which led them to that victory and hence prepared them to look to that leadership in the future. The interests of the American people themselves demand that the war end

* In the argument which follows, it is important to distinguish between the general Movement—particularly that against the war, a mass phenomenon—and what I refer to as the organized Movement, i.e., those segments of the general Movement now functioning in political organizations. Usually the context makes the meaning clear; otherwise the distinction is made explicit.

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rapidly and in complete defeat for the administration, exposing overall Cold War policies to further popular disbelief and loathing, and the architects of those policies to further discredit and distrust. The interests of our own people also demand that they come to see that they themselves have joined with the National Liberation Front to force the administration out of the war, that their collective strength has been rallied by radicals and socialists to win an epochal victory over their ruling class.

Such a victory is important for several reasons. Clearly, by any standard, the war is opposed to the interests of the American people, even if for no other reason than that it is they who suffer the casualties of the war and of resulting social dislocation and, of course, it is they who pay the costs of both.* Moreover, a clear victory of a popular movement over the desires of the administration would go a long way toward delaying further large-scale American military adventures in Asia, Africa, or this hemisphere. The ambiguous defeat in Korea in 1950-1953 had such an effect for seven years or so; a clear defeat in Vietnam would preclude further adventures perhaps even longer.

A popular victory would also decisively weaken an important segment of the ruling class, namely, the militarist bloc consisting of the aerospace and electronics industries, the military leadership, and their patrons and puppets in the Congress such as Stennis, Rivers, and Jackson. Given the importance of military expenditures as a Keynesian device for economic stability and for profiteering at home and their role in economic expansion overseas, a check to the militarist bloc is at the same time a check to the ruling class as a whole.

A popular victory would also give a sharp boost to the prospects for the continuance and growth of today's mass left Movement into post-Vietnam America. There are two elements to be considered here. First of all, popular movements are dependent for their survival and growth on victories. Revolutionary elites may prosper on a continuous diet of heroic defeats (for a while anyway), but mass movements lose their cohesion and hence their will to struggle unless nourished periodically by

* I return to this point on p. 44 below.

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the recognition that they are accomplishing something. Naturally no popular victory over the administration on Vietnam will guarantee the subsequent continuance and growth of a mass, multi-issue movement of the Left. But the lack of such a victory might well preclude the continuance of a mass Left in tomorrow's political life.

The second element to consider is that we want the mass of Americans to gain and keep confidence in radical and socialist leadership. It is not enough that Americans win their victory over the government or even that they become thereby confirmed in their knowledge of their collective strength. It is also important that they look to radicals and socialists for leadership in the social struggle now, that they recognize radicalism and socialism as integral to their struggles, and that they develop a more enduring confidence in radical and socialist leadership for the future. Until March 1968, things were very promising along this line, for the bare fact of the matter was that until then the broad movement against the war was created and led by radicals and socialists. But since Johnson's "resignation" speech many of the more radical elements in our Movement have simply refused to exercise leadership in the mass struggle against the war. In spite of a great deal of posturing about our superior ideological awareness, radicals and socialists have shown themselves less capable of operating in the context of the Paris talks and accompanying military slowdown than either the mild liberal leadership of the Moratorium, the Old Left/pacifist leaders of the Mobilization, or the small handful of religious people who have been destroying draft records. Our capacity to exercise a leading role in a post-war mass movement of the Left will be almost nil if we cannot reassert our leading role in the antiwar movement now and direct it toward a drive for an unambiguous popular victory over the administration's strategic stalling.

Since March 1968, and with the usual numerous exceptions, radicals and socialists have been much more concerned to preach the evils of imperialism in general than to apply their admittedly superior analysis of the war and its significance in a practical way in the mass struggle against the Empire. In this

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they have acted like the very liberals whom they scorn at every turn. Let me explain.

The most serious radical criticism of liberal modes of political analysis is that liberals tend to treat social, political, and economic struggles between the conflicting interests of real groups of men and women as if they were debates. As Carol Brightman has pointed out, this is why the liberals allowed themselves to be outflanked by Johnson and Nixon. Since differences on the war were a matter of "issues," once the liberals had the better arguments they began to lose interest in the war, for they had "won" the debate. Ergo, the war would soon be over. (This explanation is oversimplified but essentially accurate.)

Yet radicals and socialists have not really behaved very differently in the same period, for they have treated imperialism as an "issue," that is, as something about which it is sufficient to argue, preach, propagandize, and (for some) "struggle sharply" over. True, they have applied their views on imperialism to overseas struggles (but, as viewed from the United States; hence largely a matter of preaching too). But they have not applied them to domestic America. Such an application demands far more than assertions about issues—racism, capitalism, imperialism, and so forth. It would in fact demand an analysis of the objective interests of the various contending parties and of the way in which international developments affect their relative positions in the continuing struggle. In short, it would demand something like the analysis I have presented in such rudimentary fashion here. (And, of course, the analysis would have to be given political and organizational expression.)

Implicit in what I have argued so far is a criticism of contemporary radicals and socialists which goes much beyond tactical matters. The basic weakness exposed by our failure to adjust our perceptions and tactics to Vietnamese developments has been our unconcern and ignorance of the interests of the great mass of Americans. That is, we did not understand the interests of the American people in relation to developments in Paris and Vietnam because we were not terribly concerned with their interests in general.

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Let me suggest that the reason for this state of affairs can be found, as much as anywhere, in the very widely held, though seldom expressed, opinion that the coming of socialism to America would be "good for" blacks, the people of the Third World, and perhaps young people, but certainly not for the ordinary working person and his family. My argument is that our preoccupation with the view that socialism is for export only, so to speak, blocks us from any systematic effort at deciphering the general interest of the American people, a flagrant instance of which has been our inability to identify their interest in relation to Paris and Vietnam. Yet there is very persuasive evidence that the social, economic, and political life of most Americans is undergoing very rapid and profound deterioration at the present time, a deterioration rooted in the most fundamental characteristics of technologically advanced capitalism.* If this is indeed the case, then the coming of a socialist America is very much in the interests of the great bulk of the American people. The sooner radicals and socialists turn their attention to deciphering and understanding those interests, the sooner they can set to work to lead Americans in satisfying them.

But nothing is more in the interests of the American people now than their victory in Vietnam, that is, the complete, unambiguous, and rapid defeat of the administration's six objectives, as earlier described. The interests of the American people are coterminous with those of the Vietnamese people, though different in practical content. As I have tried to show, satisfying those interests demands that radicals and socialists apply, in practical ways, their superior understanding of imperialism in order to regain the leading role in the antiwar movement and lead it to the victory it requires. We have worked for many years now to defeat the administration on Vietnam, to bring about a people's victory over the U.S. ruling class. It is sheer foolishness to throw away, as we have been doing, the profound victory which

* For an extended discussion of the features of advanced technological capitalism, its ideology, its antagonism to popular interests, and its relation to the growth of the Movement, see my review of Lasch's *The Agony of the American Left* (*The Nation,* June 23, 1969) and, especially, "Technology: The Opiate of the Intellectuals" (*New York Review,* July 31, 1969).

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lies almost in our grasp. Frankly, to do so is to betray the historic mission assigned to radicals of our generation.

3 The Movement vs. The Government

The analysis here presented leads naturally to six practical directives. They are clear enough not to require lengthy explanation.

(1) At the present time the struggle between the American people and the ruling class over Vietnam is of decisive historical importance. It is *not less important* than any other struggle—than that between blacks per se and the U.S. ruling class, or that between Vietnamese and the U.S. ruling class, for example. Therefore it demands appropriate Movement priority.

(2) The administration has already been partially defeated in Vietnam by pincers consisting of military force exercised by the NLF in Vietnam and political force exercised by a mass movement here at home. Each element in the pincers is indispensable to the other. But so long as the mild de-escalation of ground fighting persists in Vietnam, the burden of struggle falls *relatively* heavier on us than before. Thus, agitational and organizational efforts *against* the war ought to be intensified at the present time.

(3) The form of the struggle in the United States is not primarily a propaganda battle between analyses emphasizing imperialism and those emphasizing "mistakes." It is a struggle between the interests of the great mass of Americans and those of their ruling class. Perhaps at an earlier time propaganda and agitation deserved priority. But most Americans now want out of the war, though often for the wrong reasons. We should, of course, try to persuade them of the right reasons, but our real priority must be to mobilize opposition sentiment, which already exists or which exists in passive or latent form, into effective mass opposition to the war. The first stage of the antiwar movement is over—the persuasion stage. A second and more difficult stage has begun–the mobilization stage. Now our main task is to lead people into political and organizational conflict with the administration. That ought to be the strategic line of the organized Movement.

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Tactically speaking, it is not clear whether this requires radicals and socialists (a) to work within the going mass organizations, clarifying their politics and pressing more militant action on them (Mobe and Moratorium); (b) to supplement them with militant antiwar organizing efforts among the large mass of the unorganized (functional organizations for working people, students not in prestige colleges, women, etc.); or (c) to set up rival umbrella organizations (i.e., mass organizations with broad appeal, led by radicals and socialists).

My own feeling is that the main weight of our effort should fall on (b) and (c), but while doing propaganda work among the Mobe and Moratorium. I say "feeling," however, because people with more tactical experience than I are better able to judge how our energies would be most efficiently distributed. But the strategic line argued here is clear and compelling; it ought to be a line of "mass, militant struggle against the Empire," not merely "mass agitation" (or exemplary action) about imperialism.

(4) Propaganda directed against administration policy should include charges of the incompetence and deviousness of government officials, as well as their resort to criminal policies. Such propaganda is not apolitical, as many radicals and socialists appear to believe. Since it weakens the legitimacy of the ruling class it is political in the highest degree.

More broadly, Movement criticism of the war has been woefully inadequate insofar as it has generally failed to link arguments against the war with the interests of the American people in any clear and compelling way. Our arguments in this direction have usually emphasized casualties and dollar costs, though many of us shy away from the latter as an immoral appeal (don't kill Vietnamese, it costs too much) or as an appeal based on liberal misconceptions about what is possible in the United States (if we didn't spend it on guns, we could spend it on schools and hospitals). The administration policy of continuing the war should be directly linked to the need to stabilize an inherently unstable economy, to the profits of the aerospace and electronics manufacturers, and to the military needs of overseas investors. Striking instances of the latter two

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cases should be developed. The growth of lawless, unconstitutional, anti-democratic behavior within government, and of a military caste—a state within the state—should also be attacked, as should the growth of neo-imperialist ideologies among the ruling class. High interest rates, soak-the-little-fellow tax policies, and rapid inflation should also be attacked, as well as uncontrolled and socially harmful technological innovation and expansion which bring speed-ups, layoffs, deterioration of the environment, and growing social regimentation. The significance of this last point is not that the war is caused by a runaway technology but that both the war and the technology are in the narrow interests of the same large institutions and have parallel harmful effects on the lives of most Americans. The failure of socialists and radicals up to now to relate the general tendencies of technologically advanced capitalism to clear ideas of popular interests has been the most harmful of all the Movement's failures. It makes our ability to lead popular struggles a hit-or-miss affair and gives our leadership an episodic quality, when what is needed is the ability to develop popular struggles over the long haul.

(5) The tendency of radicals and socialists to engage in liberal-baiting should be subordinated to the needs of the movement. Senators Fulbright and Goodell, Sam Brown, and others like them, whatever their long-run aspirations and whatever their ideology, are our short-run allies in combating the administration (and hence the ruling class) on the Vietnam War. Naturally, one should not overlook the real differences between liberals like Brown and ourselves, particularly as those differences bear on the development of the mass movement. Brown, for example, while a short-run ally, also represents a rival, hostile, and, in the long run, harmful leadership group. This being the case, merely putting him down for ideological failings is beside the point. We should be out-organizing him, not merely out-talking him. Senator Fulbright represents a different situation. His views on the war and the information he has unearthed have helped us far more than they have helped the milk-and-water critics. He deserves to be praised for that, and the resoluteness and deftness of his opposition to the administration should

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be held out as a model for other public officials to follow. Senator Goodell again represents a different case. He appears merely to be riding the public-opinion polls. Fine, we don't mind that. We should just point out that it is popular opposition to the war which brought him out of the woodwork and that people should be dissatisfied that he does so little about stopping the war.

To return to the Sam Brown case—much the most serious one. It is not easy for the organized Movement, that is, activist radicals and socialists functioning in loose groups, to cooperate with Brown and his associates against the administration while at the same time struggling with them over the leadership, program, ideology, and directions of a mass movement. The reason for this is that radicals and socialists have been woefully irresponsible when it comes to establishing effective organizations, especially at the national level. I am told that the New University Conference is the only socialist political organization now capable of carrying out a national program. If indeed this is the case, is it not fair to ask: what do all those self-styled "organizers" in the Movement organize? More precisely, what time perspective do they organize for—an action, a month, or a year-long struggle? What interests do they organize around—the evanescent ones of this temporary group of people or something calculated to be more lasting? What are their objectives—to build radical consciousness or to give radical consciousness institutional and organizational form? What numbers of people are they satisfied to unite in organizational solidarity—eleven, two hundred, or several hundred thousand? One of the reasons that radicals and socialists are limited to attacking the so-called moderate take-over of the antiwar movement with an escalating rhetoric is that they do not grasp the organizational tools which are necessary to assert an alternate leadership.

This organizational failure of the Left is dependent on a wider failure which is related to random liberal-baiting. Radicals and socialists should distinguish systematically between liberals committed to the Cold War, anti-Communism, capitalism, elitism, and so forth, and those liberals, the great mass of liberals in fact, who are really put off by American society today, who

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already have lost faith in the organized liberal establishment, but who are more or less uncertain of how much can be done in the country by way of change and of what this change should be. This is one of our natural constituencies whose importance and numbers should not be overlooked or gratuitously bad-mouthed.

(6) The antiwar struggle is a necessary prelude to the larger struggle to build a mass movement of the American people against the ruling class. The main task of the organized Movement is to clarify the interests of the American people and lead them in the struggle to win those interests. Consequently, one of the first tasks of the organized Movement is to clarify the interests of the American people *in relation to the war,* and set about helping Americans to satisfy them.

(7) All six administration objectives must be fought as being inimical to the interests of the American people; and the *identity of interests* between the National Liberation Front (i.e., the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam) and the American people must be clearly upheld.

We want a victory for the Vietnamese people and we want a victory for our own people. The definition of both victories is spelled out by the defeat of all six administration objectives.

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BOOKS

OIL AND THE THIRD WORLD

BY HARVEY O'CONNOR

The Political Economy of International Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries, by Michael Tanzer. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969; $12.50.

How little is really known of the arcane international oil industry, its secrets locked in the cold bosoms of seven petroleum giants who control most of the non-communist world's treasure of liquid energy! A few courageous souls have examined what can be seen from the outside, these few mainly journalists and economists reduced to speculation about what goes on in the opulent board rooms of Standard of New Jersey, Royal Dutch/Shell, and the other titans.

Dr. Michael Tanzer is the exception. An economist who writes lucid prose, he has been on the inside, working for Esso (Standard of New Jersey). An excellent vantage point from which to see how the international oil companies handle their affairs in the Third World. Passionately on the side of the "underdeveloped" countries in their search for economic independence, Tanzer is not content merely to describe their plight. He advises all the Laocoöns how they may escape the tentacles that hold them in growing poverty while the capitalist world grows ever richer.

There is no doubting the power of the international companies whom State Departments and Foreign Offices serve as willing handmaidens to assure the inflow of billions of dollars/pounds.

Harvey O'Connor is the author of *The Empire of Oil* and *World Crisis in Oil,* both MR Press books

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This golden current has saved the British pound from bankruptcy and helps Uncle Sam to serve as the world's gendarme, safeguarding wells, derricks, tankers, and markets whose wealth is greater than that of all the Third World.

But perhaps, after all, this monolithic monster is but a paper tiger. Tanzer indicates that Achilles has his heel. How else account for little Cuba defying Standard and Shell, expropriating their refineries, and surviving, although only a scant ninety miles off the Florida coast? The obvious reason is that Cuba was backed by another superpower, the Soviets, and Washington was loath to hazard atomic warfare even when confronted by such a threat to its imperial power. Indeed it may be said that the very opulence of the oil cartel is a weakness, for it has incited others to seek their own sources for the most lucrative liquid. The entry of independent oil operators into fields such as Libya, Iran, the Trucial States, Nigeria, and elsewhere has loosened the cartel's monopolistic grip on crude oil, with a resultant weakening of the price structure which was once a peculiar glory of the imperialist world. The fact is, Tanzer points out, that there is enough oil under concession right now to last into the twenty-first century, and a good portion of it is not under the cartel's control.

Mexico offers a striking example of the ability of a small country to defy the cartel, nationalize its properties, and prosper; and Mexico is much nearer than ninety miles to the Colossus of the North. Lázaro Cárdenas destroyed several shibboleths that had consoled the cartel. One was that Mexico lacked the technical skill to manage a complex industry. He proved that Mexicans are clever, too, much to the dismay of the arrogant *yanquis* who predicted that Cárdenas would come crawling on his belly, entreating them to repossess their properties. Even more important, Mexico decided to use its oil to industrialize its own country and improve agriculture, rather than exporting 90 percent of it. The cheap oil lubricated domestic commerce and manufacture. This solution may not be open to countries such as Kuwait, with enormous reserves but little possibility of developing significant industry or agriculture on a barren desert. But it certainly is a possibility for countries with sizable populations and agricultural and industrial potentialities such as Iraq and Iran. The loss of foreign markets could be compensated over the years by the development of a domestic economy which would lift many a country from the "underdeveloped" category.

Tanzer indicates any number of intriguing possibilities for

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such countries. Iran could export oil to India in return for Indian exploration in that country. Crucial to the development of backward agricultural societies is the use of precious natural gas, now flared in the billions of cubic feet because there is little market for it in the Near East. This is the basic feed stock for a petrochemical industry to produce the fertilizers so desperately needed in countries such as Iraq, Iran, and India if agriculture is to flourish.

The countries rich in oil and poor in everything else have maneuverability, now that capitalist and communist blocs are breaking up. They might play off various oil corporations against each other and take advantage of the offers of the Soviets and Rumania in recent years to provide exploration techniques, build refineries, and advance the credits needed for such development.

Then why don't they do it? Because, argues Tanzer, in most of these countries the enemy of economic development is the ruling cliques that misgovern them. Some, such as Saudi Arabia, prefer to waste the billion dollars a year in oil revenues on neon-lighted palaces in the desert, on a profligate luxury that is a deadly affront to their own impoverished people. In more populous countries part of the revenue is drained off into arms, planes, lush perquisites for the military parasites who keep the various Shahs on their peacock thrones.

India is a special case. Tanzer—who, let it be noted, worked there for Esso—devotes several chapters to an examination of that sleeping giant. The Soviets offered the Indian government the opportunity of escaping from the grasp of the oil cartel. At considerable cost to Moscow, the Soviets—for obvious political advantages—offered New Delhi barter arrangements by which Soviet crude oil could be exchanged for whatever India had to offer. More importantly, they offered to build refineries, pipe lines, explore the terrain for oil, and put India on its feet as a going economic concern. The Indian government flirted with such proposals, which were enticing not only to the Left but also to nationalist business interests outside the comprador-importer sector. As in Cuba and elsewhere, the cartel companies, deeply entrenched in India through the decades of British rule, refused flatly to refine Soviet crude, and the Indian government knuckled under. Despite this, the Soviets and Rumania have helped the country develop its own sources of crude and have built refineries and pipe lines. But the cartel, forced by Soviet competition to lower the price of crude somewhat, nevertheless bled India of precious

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foreign exchange. India would have saved $140 million a year by importing Soviet crude rather than the cartel's expensive oil from the Arabian-Persian Gulf. Add to that the extortion in inflated tanker rates, in refinery and pipe line profits, and in the marketing network. A sorry loss for a government that claims to be "socialist" but permits itself to be exploited by the most avaricious of all international industries.

What a contrast China presents! Under imperialism, China was merely a market for refined oil products (oil for the lamps of China) and little effort was made to produce domestic crude. In 1952 energy consumption in that country and India, per capita, was about the same. By 1965 Chinese crude oil production had increased twentyfold, and energy production rose twice as fast as in the Indian subcontinent.

Aside from Soviet aid in the 1950s, the Chinese expansion has been achieved by the Chinese themselves, with not a dollar of drain in precious foreign exchange, and no profits put into the pockets of the international oil corporations. Her chemical fertilizer production, based largely on oil and essential to agriculture, is now three to five times as great as India's. "At the same time that India was becoming increasingly dependent upon Western aid and particularly United States aid for its fertilizer supplies," comments Tanzer, "the Chinese became independent of Soviet assistance in this area."

This review does little justice to Dr. Tanzer's extraordinary achievement in dissecting the problem of petroleum in the underdeveloped countries. The role of the State Department, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in chaining the poverty-stricken part of the world to Wall Street is examined in rich detail. A country-by-country analysis of oil exporting and importing countries in the Third World is required reading for anyone concerned in the mechanics of imperialism. In one small item Tanzer might revise his view that the national oil companies in Latin America are declining in importance. Since his book was written Peru and Bolivia have taken giant strides in freeing themselves from the cartel.

When monopolists succeed, the people fail.
—Henry Demarest Lloyd, 1888

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CORRESPONDENCE

POLITICS IN COMMAND: A COMMENTARY

What Franz Fanon did when he offered to the dispossessed of this world a chance to change their ways, Dan Aldridge tries to do once more ("Politics in Command of Economics: Black Economic Development," MR, November 1969). Aldridge has extended to us another invitation to examine our ways and change our practices. And such an invitation must be issued again and again, for it seems that America's dispossessed either have not learned, cannot learn, or refuse to learn.

Aldridge speaks clearly to the brothers and sisters, and to all who would listen, not of their dreams but of their everyday perceptions, not of their hopes but of their sufferings, not of their fantasies and wishes but of their reality. He speaks first of an important relation that the ownership classes will not openly discuss, the relation between political power and economic development. For certainly these owners will not discuss the topic with their victims. Instead, these economic robber barons talk about "black economic development," "black capitalism," even "black power," as if by utterance of the word "black" the skull and crossbones are removed from the label of a bottle of dangerous anti-human poison.

So fraudulent and transparent is this offer to blacks of a partnership in the grime of world exploitation that it is perhaps too bad that the brother had to waste space and time in pointing out the obvious. Waste time, too, in pointing out the obvious fact that while information about African kings may help the group's morale, that kind of information is no substitute for the

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skill and knowledge needed for dealing with today's problems; that knowledge of Africa's glories alone will not forge the weapons and tools to break capitalism's stranglehold on the vitals of a whole segment of the people.

Waste time, too, in pointing out how ridiculous the concept of peaceful coexistence with capitalism is. For how does one coexist with a voracious insatiable wolf? Not even other wolves who run with the international wolf pack are safe. How could the black lambs think that they would be allowed to live or exist or thrive? But such is Aldridge's fate; he must spend time on obvious truths.

Like a true brother, however, Aldridge does what he must do. He invites all to look around, yes look at the world, the rest of the world where others are oppressed and exploited by the same inhuman use of human beings that is capitalism.

I suppose he must spend time on these obvious issues, but because he must spend so much time on the very obvious he does not have time to develop and deal with issues of prime concern to black people and those who would grasp the insanity of the capitalist social order.

He begins to ask and comment about the self-seeking opportunism lurking in the shattered small egos of the Soul Brother Pretenders—the dashiki demagogues, those spectacular Afros with the processed minds, the long of lip but short of limb, those verbally facile meeting-disrupters who save capitalism from its contradiction by performing their ritual suicide. He has just two lines about the conception and development of a sense of a collective reality when two volumes may be required for that subject.

Aldridge raises the issue of revolutionary morality in one paragraph, at a time when the morality of dog-eat-dog cannibalism has begun to erode the sacrificing fiber of not just a few self-styled popular folk heroes. Aldridge offers us study in place of mindless repetition of dogma, proposes discipline in place of doing your own thing, and protracted struggle in place of quick spontaneous uprisings. And these are the hard truths of our times.

As if that were not enough—and for many it would have been—Aldridge suggests that not all nonwhites share a sense of brotherhood, that the bourgeois capitalist spirit sometimes prompts the nonwhite realtor, insurance man, ethnic informer sometimes called newspaperman, radio station operator, and medical man to act against the interests of the group. Yet he does not face a hard fact, that some nonwhites are indeed not brothers at all except to

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the other capitalist wolves. These nonwhites are not black—save in appearance. They share no real sense of brotherhood with anyone, and in place of brotherhood they have erected personal ambition. These persons wish only to maintain their personal credentials, their personal access to wealth, to status, to fame, to a piece of the action. Yes, the struggle is first with ourselves, but who is the "our" in this case? Is it not so, that a parallel ever-identical struggle must go on within all men—white men, yellow men, and black men?

It would be too much to think that between us (you as the author and I as the commentator), there is complete agreement. Black revolutionary struggle or feasible revolutionary struggle? Black revolutionary strategy or successful revolutionary strategy? It is time for those who would struggle to be free to put away the romanticization of a compartmentalized revolutionary struggle (usually in one's own private compartment), be the individual young or old, male or female, black or white. It is now time we set about doing what must be done, rather than taking it out in talk. Talk that warns, talk that alerts, talk that promises the fire next time but offers no matches, talk that opens meaningless offers of "compromise." A compromise as the capitalist wolf puts it is merely winning back 50 percent of ourselves.

I am not saying that there are no tasks that we and we alone as blacks can and must do, nor am I saying that there is no place for hot words of passion and fury. I am suggesting that we must not indulge ourselves in postures or phrases as in masturbatory flights of fancy. "We must indeed change our ways."

But too much has been accomplished by Dan Aldridge to fritter it away in small quarrels. For he points out the road ahead, helps us see what the world really is, helps us to grasp more clearly some of our strengths and some of our weaknesses. He beckons us onward to realize ourselves, not in the myths of individualism and self-seeking opportunism but in the vision of a new society in which man can truly realize himself.

*C. E. Wilson**

* C. E. Wilson is a free-lance writer and was formerly Unit Administrator of Intermediate School 201 in Harlem.

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PROBLEMS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

BY NICOLÁS GUILLÉN

Monsieur Dupont calls you uncultured
because you cannot say who was
Victor Hugo's favorite grandson.

Herr Muller has started to scream
because you do not know (exactly)
the day that Bismarck died.

Mr. Smith,
an Englishman or Yankee, I cannot tell,
explodes when you write *Shell.*
(It seems that you eliminate an *L*
and, what is more, pronounce it *chel.*)

Well, so what?
When your turn comes,
tell them to say Huancavelica,[1]
and where the Aconcagua's[2] found,
and who was Sucre,[3]
and in what spot on the planet
Martí died.
(Please:
Have them always speak to you in Spanish.)

Translated by Robert Marquez

1. A town in the Peruvian Andes.
2. The highest peak in South America, located in the Andes in Western Argentina: Height: 23,080 ft.
3. Antonio José de Sucre (1793-1830), Venezuelan general, one of the liberators of South America, first president of Bolivia (1826-1828).

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socialist Revolution

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

A Study in Chaos

Military thinking is logical. Military planning is scientific. Military discipline is rigid. Comes war and this rational pattern dissolves into chaos. In our generation Europe has been through many minor wars and two major ones. It is still in the grip of chaos.

Every intelligent European knows that there is strength in unity; that economic and political rationalization are keys to stability and security; that a continent-wide division of labor and marketing are workable and profitable; that the federal principle of local control of local matters and central control of general matters will promote general welfare.

Within the past fortnight (in early December 1969) representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty nations have held a two-day session. Chiefs of the European Community have discussed their common problems, an effort has been made to create a regional Scandinavian grouping (NORDEK), yet in the closing weeks of 1969 Europe is effectively divided:

- Twenty-four years after war's end, no general treaty has been made, legalizing the decisions at Potsdam in 1945.
- The Iron Curtain which separates East Europe from West Europe still obstructs traffic and prevents common action.
- Germany, the most productive nation of Western Europe, is divided, east from west.
- Britain and other nations are denied entrance to the Common Market.
- The air and water approaches to Europe are patrolled by United States armed forces and some 300,000 armed United States personnel are stationed in Europe.

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European public affairs are still dominated by the chaos following the War of 1914-1918, and intensified by the wars of 1936-1945. The consequences of this chaos are clearly expressed in the Declaration issued by the NATO ministers following their December 4-5, 1969 meeting.

The most immediate item on their agenda was an invitation, initiated by the Soviet Union, to hold a pan-European conference to discuss European peace and security. At their meeting in Washington, in April 1969, NATO members had "expressed the intention of their governments to examine, with the Soviet Union and the other countries of East Europe, what concrete questions offered the best chance of fruitful negotiations and speedy solutions." (NATO Declaration, Item 3)

> The ministers have again expressed the interest which the Alliance has in the control of armaments and in disarmament and recalls the declaration on the reduction and equilibration of forces adopted at Reykjavik in 1968 and confirmed at Washington in 1969. The members of the Alliance have agreed that this suggestion has not brought results. Nevertheless the Allies have pursued and are pursuing their studies in order to prepare a realistic basis for the active exploration of the problem. (Item 5)

We should note in passing that following the cease-fire in 1918, and until the ill-fated Disarmament Conference of the early 1930s, and again following the cease-fire in 1945, similar good intentions have been repeatedly expressed. Meanwhile the arms race which got under way in the early 1960s continues and escalates from year to year.

NATO ministers postponed acceptance of the Soviet bid for a pan-European Conference until "careful preparation" had been made and there could be a perspective of "concrete results in all essential matters." (Item 14) Meanwhile the principle of joint action with East Europe could be expressed through a "vast cooperation" in a specialized field such as "oceanography." (Item 13)

Once more, as in the classic fable, the mountain, in labor, had brought forth a mouse. Can anyone conceive of a more flagrant application of the fatal formulation, "delay, linger, wait"?

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Item 2 of the NATO Declaration states that

peace and security in Europe can be founded only upon the following principles: sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of European states, the right of each European people to forge its own future, the pacific handling of differences, non-interference in the internal affairs of another state whatever the social and political regime, and the renunciation of the menace or the use of force against any state.

Under these political axioms the states of modern Europe were established. Under these auspices, during the past sixty years, preparations for war and the prosecution of war, with its resulting chaos, have been the chief preoccupation of the European powers. Again in December 1969 spokesmen for the big powers of Central and West Europe have assembled, temporized, evaded, and adjourned in a chaotic Europe divided, armed to the teeth, occupied by a foreign power, and drifting toward another period of general war.

Getting Ready for War

War is the use of armed force as an instrument of policy; it may be domestic (civil) war or international. In either case it is an attempt by one social group to promote its own interests and impose its will upon other social groups.

War-making is a profession. The war-making apparatus is an institution of major importance in all civilized communities.

Nineteen-seventy finds the nations spending the equivalent of $160 billion on preparations for war and the conduct of war. About half of this outlay is being made by the United States. At no time in recent history have war preparations been more extensive, more technically efficient, more costly.

War as Combat

War is conventionally pictured as a series of combats between two or more rivals. Each is equipped and armed. Each seeks to win a victory over its opponents, always designated as "enemies."

At certain periods in history when rival armies faced each

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other, each side by common consent chose a champion; the two fought it out and the victor was acclaimed. The rank and file of both armies then went back to their fields and workshops.

More recently armies have been composed of trained officers and mercenary soldiers. With them war was a profession. Napoleon conscripted his armies. Today professional officers direct conscript mass armies in all of the principal countries.

War by land, war by sea, war in the air, biological and chemical war and wars of long-distance missiles are the order of the day. War is more and more total, with entire nations embattled, with the civil state—under martial law—transformed into the warfare state.

War as Demolition and Annihilation

Early in the War of 1914-1918 soldiers still fought soldiers. As the United States entered the war, in April 1917, the artist Howard Chandler Christie painted a big poster on the side of a midtown New York building. A burly, broad-shouldered, redhead was pulling off his coat. His face was contorted with anger. Above the picture Christie painted: "Germans make war on women and children." Underneath the picture: "Tell that to the Marines!"

In those far-off halcyon days a war directed against civilians was still a scandal. Today it is a commonplace. The slaughter in My Lai (Pinksville) is one small episode in a vast panorama. Civilians were deliberately starved in both general wars. Saturation bombing became a science and an art.

Wars between professional armies have been expanded into wars between warfare states. Conscript standing armies are equipped with the latest technical devices for destroying and killing. Wars between men give place to wars between machines. General MacArthur described the change to a Los Angeles veterans meeting: "When I joined the armed forces," he said, "one man fought a fellow man. Today, with nuclear energy, one man can kill a million." Each state seeks, by any and every means, to overwhelm its enemies, using terror tactics directed against entire populations, which are designed to weaken their will to resist.

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I spoke with a French artillery officer who boasted of the geometric and mathematical accuracy of modern artillery. "Give us a target within range," he said, "and we will lay down a barrage that will cover every square meter. Technically, it is beautiful. The only drawback is that people are bound to be hurt."

In the War of 1939-1945 saturation bombing became an accepted way of life. Population centers like Dresden were laid flat. Fire storms were set in Hamburg, Tokyo. Warsaw was wiped off the map. On August 6 and 13, 1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were leveled by two atom bombs. Soldiers in the trenches and sailors on their ships were comparatively safe. Civilians were slaughtered wholesale. War had become a process of demolishing habitations and exterminating populations.

It is for this war on women, children, and other helpless onlookers that the military preparations of 1970 are being made.

Is War an Answer?

Europe is gripped by the chaos resulting from sixty years of war preparation and war making. Together with other parts of the modern world, Europe is preparing for another general war. Are such preparations and such a war a solution for European chaos or will they multiply disunity and intensify chaos?

Another general war in Europe will not solve the problems that have divided Europe and led to the downgrading of the Western European powers and their occupation by non-European armed forces.

If the half century of Cold War should lead to a military struggle between the United States and its European allies on one side and the Soviet Union on the other, Central and West Europe would once again become the battlefield. Even if conventional weapons were used, such as those which smashed Berlin in the 1940s, losses would be catastrophic. If nuclear weapons were used, losses would be all the more frightful.

Europe, in its present form, is not designed to survive another general war. What it needs most is political, economic, and cultural integration. National frontiers must be reduced to

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an administrative level. Each European state must take its place in a pan-European federation, with necessary powers delegated to a central organization, with the greatest possible local autonomy consistent with overall political and economic efficiency. Such a state could prove effective only insofar as the peoples of Europe recognized the supremacy of general European welfare side by side with local self-determination.

Pan-Europe, as a regional organization, would be integrated into a united world organization composed of representatives from the various continental localities. Would such groupings be cumbersome? At the outset there would be manifold need for improvement, but the principle of each for all and all for each, coupled with the federal principle of central administration and local self-determination could substitute world law for world war, end chaos, and inaugurate a war-free world community.

Occupied Puerto Rico

Professor G. L. García of the University of Puerto Rico has written a letter to *Le Monde* (12/9/69) from which I quote:

> Puerto Rico is one big military fortress of the United States: to the west of the island is the Roosevelt-Road base where one finds the naval headquarters of the Caribbean and a base for atomic submarines and aircraft carriers; to the northeast, the Ramey Base of the Strategic Air Command; in San Juan, the capital, the general headquarters of the Tenth Naval District of the United States, and Fort Buchanan; to the southeast, the island of Vieques (from which the majority of the population was obliged to emigrate) is a great training base for the American Marines. The Army of the United States owns about 13 percent of the cultivable land of the island.
>
> In the face of this vast military deployment, the American government denies the control which it exercises over the island, alleging that the latter has its own constitution. In reality the Puerto Ricans have the freedom to elect administrators who have no authority over the vital aspects of the life of the country. The actual authority is exercised by the United States Congress.

Is it any wonder that there is a strong movement for national independence among the Puerto Ricans?

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(*Continued from inside front cover*)

ford on imperialism. His own paper, entitled "Imperialism Without Colonies," is scheduled for January 23.

Few MR articles in the last few years have attracted more attention than Margaret Benston's "Political Economy of Women's Liberation" in the September 1969 issue. It has already been reprinted and translated numerous times and has been the subject of widespread discussion and appreciation among women's liberation groups. The Benston article can therefore serve as an ideal example of what MR aims to accomplish: to provide original material of a non-specialist character of educational use to the whole radical movement.

In this connection let us say again what we have said before, both privately and in print, that we as editors do not necessarily agree with everything that goes into the magazine. The varieties of Marxism and socialism in the movement today are legion, and it is not our function or intention to foster any brand of orthodoxy. We may even on occasion print things that are anti-Marxist or anti-socialist if we think a useful educational purpose is served.

A subscriber writes to suggest a way to get existing MR readers to enlist new readers. Offer to send copies, she says, to any two addresses for a one-dollar bill. This way readers can introduce their friends to MR with a minimum of paperwork and without having to lend or give away their own copies. A good idea, but we'll improve on it. We'll send sample copies *free* to as many addresses of non-subscribers, up to a dozen, as you may send us. We have been offering free sample copies in small ads in the left and liberal press, and it seems to be an effective method of reaching new people. The present offer is an extension of the same principle, and we hope readers will take advantage of it. Please remember that a free sample copy is likely to make more of an impact if you write or tell the prospective recipient that it is coming and that you personally recommend MR.

MR Press has been experiencing an unexpectedly rapid increase in book orders, chiefly for use in college courses. This is of course very gratifying, but it does have a negative side. When orders run ahead of expectations, inventories are depleted and on occasion completely exhausted. This has happened recently on as many as five or six titles at once, and the result of course is delay in filling orders until new printings can be completed. In the future, print and reprint orders will be revised upward to prevent a recurrence of this kind of situation. In the meantime the Press hopes that readers will understand and excuse delays which could hardly have been foreseen and prevented.

A letter from Samir K. Ghosh, visiting professor of sociology at the Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSRe.V. (8 München 22, Mannhardtstrasse 6, West Germany) requests a copy of Margaret Benston's article on women's liberation and adds: "If it is within the scope of your journal, please inform your readers that the Seventh World Congress of Sociology, which will meet in Varna, Bulgaria, September 14-19, 1970, will have a section on the sociology of race relations. Papers or suggestions are cordially invited by the writer [Prof. Ghosh], chairman of the group, in particular on (a) minorities in Marxist theory and practice, and (b) women as a minority community."

Any MR readers who may be in the National Guard or the Reserves should know about the Reservists' Committee to Stop the War, P.O. Box 4398, Berkeley, California 94704. The Committee is circulating an anti-war petition which can be obtained by writing to this address.

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

LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR REVOLUTION

By Andre Gunder Frank

The thesis Frank spelled out for Chile and Brazil in his first book, **Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America,** is here extended to Latin America as a whole. It is the colonial structure of world capitalism, in his view, which produced and maintains the underdevelopment characteristic of Latin America and the rest of the Third World. This colonial structure penetrates everywhere in Latin America. It transforms these nations and imposes characteristic features of poverty and backwardness which are not primarily the remnants of an ancient "feudal" past but the direct products of capitalism. This development of underdevelopment will persist, therefore, until the people of Latin America free themselves from world capitalism by means of revolution. The Cuban Revolution is viewed as the first effort in a continent-wide revolutionary process directed against both imperialism and the national bourgeoisie.

"A book any thinking American should read."—**Library Journal.**

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PERU 1965: NOTES ON A GUERRILLA EXPERIENCE

By Héctor Béjar

Héctor Béjar is a guerrilla commander who has been in Lima's San Quintín prison since 1966. His book describes and analyzes the Peruvian guerrilla experience and, because of the unusual abilities and qualifications of the author, is a document of the first importance.

Béjar's comrades were exterminated by the army, and the Ayacucho peasants who participated in his insurrection were massacred; he himself has endured illness, defeat, and imprisonment. But he describes the events in which he took part as an activist and strategist on the highest level, in objective and dispassionate prose.

Béjar's remarkable book has been awarded the coveted Cuban Casa de las Américas prize by a panel which included some of the ablest writers of Latin America, as well as the German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger. This panel called the book "one of the most important of our times."

"A valuable . . . glimpse of revolutionary ferment in Latin America that calls for serious study by concerned Americans."—**Publishers' Weekly.**

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